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THE STADIUM GAME PITTSBURGH
STYLE: OBSERVATIONS ON THE
LATEST ROUND OF PUBLICLY
FINANCED SPORTS STADIA IN
STEEL TOWN, U.S.A.; AND COMPARISONS
WITH 28 OTHER MAJOR LEAGUE TEAMS
KEvIN CLARK FORSYTHE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Few domestic policy issues generated more debate in the closing dec-
ade of the twentieth-century than the propriety, nature, and extent of
public subsidies for major league sports franchises. My city, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania: "Steel Town, U.S.A." was no exception.
Ages ago, in November of 1997, to be exact, the General Assembly
of the Keystone State graciously granted the voters in ten southwestern
Pennsylvania counties the opportunity to impose an additional 0.5%
sales tax upon themselves, their fortunes, and their sacred honors; the
proceeds to be used in part to fund the construction of two new stadiums
for the Pittsburgh Pirates and Steelers. This star-crossed scheme, billed
as the "Regional Renaissance Initiative"' by its proponents, was quickly
dubbed the "Stadium Tax" by everyone else. Despite heroic efforts by a
congeries of out-of-town public relations gurus, a media blitz, and a few
million bucks, the voters, contrary to the repeated scoldings of their
"betters," respectfully, and at times not so respectfully, declined the invi-
tation to participate in this bold, innovative public-private partnership.
In some of the outlying counties the margin of disapprobation ap-
proached an embarrassing eight to one.
* Kevin Forsythe, Esquire, J.D., 1984, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; was, during
the events described in this article, the Supervisor of the Performance Auditing Section in the
Office of Tom Flaherty, City Controller of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Mr. Forsythe has pub-
lished two other law review articles, both on adventures in municipal law in Pittsburgh: Na-
tional, State, and Local Perspectives on the Regulation of Business Dislocations, 45 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 439 (1984), which chronicled the short-lived career of Pittsburgh's Plant Closing Ordi-
nance of 1983; and, more recently, Insecure Transactions: The Pittsburgh Securities Industry
and the Business Privilege Tax, 8 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 53 (1998).
1. Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Renaissance Initiative Act, 16 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 3000, 3011 (1999).
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Immediately after this resounding defeat (a few days before it in
fact), local and state elected officials, the corporate community, and me-
dia interests, in an understandable, albeit puzzling, repudiation of the
volant generale, began to cobble together what became known as "Plan
B," involving massive state subsidies ($75 million per stadium) and the
use of existing local sales tax and hotel tax revenues. The distinction
between new tax revenues, such as those rejected by the voters in No-
vember of 1997, and existing tax revenues, such as those ultimately
tapped by Plan B, while lost on the opponents of public subsidies to
sports teams, assumed the status of a metaphysical talisman among those
struggling to seize victory from the wreckage of the November, 1997 ref-
erendum. After a rumble, which can only be described as "burlesque,"
in the Pennsylvania State Legislature, Plan B passed on February 9,
1999.2
The next chapter was negotiating the actual stadium leases. This is
where I come into the picture. I was the supervisor of performance au-
diting. I was working the day watch out of Homicide when I got the call
from the Chief.. .wait a minute. That is a different story. Let me start
again.
On Tuesday, April 6, 1999, the City Council of Pittsburgh unani-
mously passed a resolution, requesting that my boss, City Controller
Tom Flaherty, conduct a study comparing the proposed stadium leases
with the Pirates and the Steelers with similar leases for Major League
Baseball (MLB) and National Football League (NFL) teams across the
country. Tom Flaherty was no stranger to the stadium finance game.
One of my enduring images of him comes from a front-page newspaper
photo taken way back in 1981, a few years before I met him, in which
young Tom, a member of City Council in those days, sits with a skeptical
scowl on his face, beside Willie Stargel of the Pirates and then-Baseball
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn. The item on the legislative table that day,
nearly twenty years ago now, was the approval of lease concessions to
the Galbraith family, then owners of the Pirates. Despite the media blitz
and efforts of heavy hitters such as Stargel and Kuhn, Councilman Tom
Flaherty cast the lone negative vote against what proved to be merely
2. The official cite to "Plan B" as of the writing of this article is Capital Facilities Debt
Enabling Act, Act 1 of 1999, Purdons Pamphlet No. 1, 183' Regular Session, at 2-17. The
existing tax revenues it utilized were a one percent add-on local sales tax that Allegheny
Countians began paying in 1994 pursuant to the Allegheny Regional Assets District Act 16
PA. CoNs. STAT. § 6101-B; and a 7% tax on the patrons of hotels and motels in Allegheny
County, 16 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 4970.2. Thus did the "region" shrink from ten counties to
one- Allegheny.
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the opening act in a two-decades-long road show ostensibly designed to
save the Pirates. Subsequent acts included an abortive attempt to sell
Three Rivers Stadium to an un-named, mysterious New York investor,
circa 1985; a public-private partnership of institutional and corporate in-
vestors who bought the team from the Galbraiths in 1986; a $20 million
loan to the Pirates from the City's Urban Redevelopment Authority,
which has never been and most likely will never be paid back; the
doomed Regional Renaissance Initiative 'h% sales tax, described above;
and finally, Plan B.
So I suppose my boss, Tom Flaherty, now City Controller Tom Fla-
herty to you, was the logical candidate to conduct an independent study
of stadium leases around the country. But it was the last thing I wanted
to do at the time. I had been working for three months on the definitive
essay on municipal snow removal, occasioned, once again, by the request
of City Council, in the wake of a near-total breakdown of the City's
snow removal plan during the ice storms of January 1999. To be pulled
off this project in order to conduct a stadium lease comparison, seemed
to me almost a parable of urban government in the late 1990s: the de-
emphasis of core municipal services and the re-direction of priorities to-
ward economic development; or stated another way: a massive shift of
public resources away from programs serving the poor and middle
classes toward big-ticket projects which further enriched the wealthy in
exchange for highly contingent promises of economic, social, and spiri-
tual well being. Nevertheless, that is the hand we were dealt, so into the
fray of benchmarking research we steadfastly marched.
These lease comparisons had been requested by one City Council-
man in particular, Dan Cohen, who also serves as one of five Board
members on the Public Auditorium Authority of Pittsburgh and Alle-
gheny County,3 the joint-governmental entity which will actually own
the new stadia, is currently overseeing their construction, and bears re-
sponsibility for negotiating, approving, and executing the leases.4 Back
in April 1999, however, no leases existed. The teams and the Authority
had entered into Memoranda of Understanding, which formed the basis
for on-going negotiations. In the case of the Pirates, a draft lease was
circulating between the team and the law firm hired to negotiate on be-
half of the public. No such draft lease was available for the Steelers.
3. This entity has recently been re-christened the "Sports and Exhibition Authority" (Au-
thority) and will, for the remainder of this article, be so designated.
4. As of the writing of these lines, early December 1999, the final leases for the two Pitts-
burgh teams have still not been approved, although back in April 1999 it seemed likely that
they might come up for a vote of approval as early as mid-summer.
200]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
Nevertheless, Councilman Cohen knew he would ultimately be called
upon to vote yes or no on final, legally binding, twenty-nine and one-half
year leases. In reviewing the proposed lease terms, he found certain
matters unacceptable and others in need of clarification. He raised the
following issues: cost overruns, rent, non-game day revenues, and park-
ing revenues, among others. These concerns set the parameters for our
work over the next two months.
One of the main purposes of this article is to present the results of
our work, and to update it since we first released our reports on May 10,
1999, for the Pirates, and June 11, 1999, for the Steelers. In the many
Tables which appear in the Appendix to this Article, I first of all, sum-
marize the lease agreements of the Pittsburgh Pirates compared with fif-
teen other MLB teams, then present comparison tables for rent, non-
game day revenues, parking revenues, and capital improvements. Next,
I do the same for the Pittsburgh Steelers, comparing their lease agree-
ment with thirteen other NFL teams; first in summary tables, then in
comparison tables looking at cost overruns, rent, naming rights, non-
game day revenues, capital improvements, and parking revenues. It is
my sincere hope that readers facing similar issues in their own cities, will
find the results of our research helpful.
Our job was to give Councilman Cohen, the Pittsburgh City Council,
the Administration of Pittsburgh Mayor Tom Murphy, and the public, an
independent, objective, reliable comparison of the proposed Pirates and
Steelers leases. In the great majority of cases, we did this on the basis of
the actual leases currently in force in the respective comparison cities.
In a few instances, we had to use Memoranda of Understanding or simi-
lar documents.5
We included those cities that used large public subsidies for either
new stadium construction or major renovations in the 1990s. We felt this
provided a sample comprehensive enough to illustrate the wide variety
across jurisdictions, while at the same time recent enough to delineate
the range of possibilities realistically available to Pittsburgh in the cur-
rent economic, political, and cultural settings. In the many tables in the
Appendix, I present the comparison cities chronologically by lease date,
from the earliest to the latest.
5. Our office will gladly provide access to these documents for those readers wishing to
conduct, or ordered to conduct, comparisons of their own. I wish also to acknowledge the
excellent help we received from Team Marketing Report (TMR) in Chicago, Illinois. This
company has a full list of sports industry informational products available for purchase, many
on the convenient CD format. Contact: 1-888-616-1867 or <http://www.teammarketing.com>.
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II. DEFINITIONS OF LEASE TERMS USED IN =m CONPAMSONS
With respect to the following terms, the reader should note:
Cost, is based on actual stadium construction costs when available,
otherwise it is based on estimates. It often does not include a variety of
infrastructure costs commonly borne by the public such as demolition
and site clearance, eminent domain costs, relocation of existing property
owners and tenants, roads, water and sewer lines, engineering, environ-
mental assessments, (frequently) architectural services, construction of
new or expanded parking facilities, and so forth. For PNC Park and the
Pirates, as well as for the Steelers in their un-named as of late-1999 sta-
dium, we have included information on the relative public versus team
shares of construction costs, as well as a category entitled, "City Tax
Revenues." Similar information for the comparison cities was beyond
the scope of this study, which, as explained above, focused on lease
terms. To the extent such information does appear in the tables below, it
will show up under rent, or gate, because it is a revenue stream dedi-
cated for a particular purpose under the terms of the lease.
Cost Overruns; was included only with respect to our Steelers Re-
port. Both Pittsburgh teams promised they would be responsible for any
cost overruns on the actual stadium construction. The Steelers, however,
attempted to insert a provision that would give them a credit against
future rents for any cost overruns they had to cover. With a yearly rent
of $250,000.00, the practical effect of this, for example on a 1% cost
overrun ($2.33 million on a total construction estimate of $233 million; a
very realistic possibility) would be to exempt them from rent for almost
nine years; a 2% cost overrun shields them from eighteen years' rent and
so on. We did not find this in any of our comparison cities for the NFL.
The Pirates did not attempt to insert such a caveat into their commit-
ment to cover cost overruns.
Rent, for the Pirates, combines "base rent" figures, when existent,
with other promised revenue streams, usually in the form of ticket
surcharges or percentages of items such as concessions, and advertising.
A particular lease may or may not refer to such a revenue stream as
"rent." The reasons for this often have more to do with the Federal tax
laws than with the economic reality of the transaction. We chose not to
elevate form over substance in conducting the Pirates study. 6 The
6. When a local government body floats bonds to finance the construction of new stadi-
ums it can only use "rent," and tax revenues to amortize a certain percentage of the periodic
principal and interest payments. If they exceed this percentage, the interest paid to bondhold-
ers can lose its tax-exempt status. See I.R.C. § 141(b) (1999).
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reader must always check the rest of the table because frequently the
dedicated revenue streams have two additional attributes: (1) they may
only occur if certain attendance thresholds are exceeded; and (2) they
may be further dedicated to capital improvements, maintenance, or
some other team or public cost.7 By the time we got to our Steelers
lease comparisons, however, we decided to jettison this approach. After
reviewing rent data gathered from our thirteen NFL comparison cities,
we came to the conclusion that it would promote clarity to dispense with
our enhanced definitions of rent and present base rent only. Other
promised revenue streams from the teams appear under their respective
categories in the Appendix's NFL summary tables.
Gate; refers to the amount collected for paid ticket admissions, and
how they are divided up. Common entries here include admissions
taxes, and ticket surcharges. It is important to note the relationship be-
tween "gate" and premium seating. In all cases of luxury boxes or suites,
club seats, etcetera, the teams' accountants will allocate a certain per-
centage of the price paid by the fan as "base admission price," while
treating the remainder as the "premium." Any team-public gate "splits"
will only occur with respect to the basic admission price, not the pre-
mium. Moreover, any attendance thresholds and "break points" used to
determine if and when the public begins to share in the "excess gate,"
will also only take into account the base admission price. This goes for
admissions taxes too, such as Pittsburgh's 5% amusement tax. The por-
tion of premium seating revenues defined as the base admission price
will be relatively low and tend to approximate the average ticket price.
Thus, unless the lease contains a specific provision sharing the revenues
from a particular form of premium seating, and there are a few examples
in the comparison tables below, the public should not expect to partici-
pate, even indirectly, in the enhanced revenues the teams stand to real-
ize from present and future forms of premium seating. The practical
effect in Pittsburgh is that the City will not receive a 5% amusement tax
on the premium portion of luxury suites, club seats, etcetera, but only six
mills (0.6%) business privilege tax. Nor will this premium portion be
7. Whether or not a particular threshold or break point is fair, realistic, or even possible,
in any given comparison city was beyond the scope of our study. In the case of the Pirates, for
example, the public is to receive 5% of the excess gate but only if the paid attendance exceeds
$44.5 million. Over the last few years at Three Rivers Stadium, the present home of both the
Pirates and Steelers, paid attendance for Pirate games has been averaging around 1.6 million
fans. The disinterested observer might reasonably conclude this is a rather optimistic attend-
ance projection, even in a new stadium. This illustrates one reason, among several, as to why
comparing cities solely on the basis of "rent" tells one very little.
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used as a base for the 5% ticket surcharge, which is to provide the team's
contribution towards capital improvements.
Concessions; typically means food, beverages, clothing, program
booklets, souvenirs, and other merchandise.
Advertising; includes in-stadium signage, outside marquees, score-
board space, etceteras. It may include sponsorship rights, endorsements,
logos, and the myriad ways creative minds have devised to "sell soap."
Naming rights appear in a separate category. Advertising also does not
include broadcast revenues at either the local or national level. We
found only one case - the Chicago White Sox - of shared broadcast reve-
nues (and then, only local), othervise they were uniformly retained by
the teams. When we got to the Steelers report we added a separate cate-
gory for broadcasting. The extent to which any broadcast revenues are
shared among the teams in the league was beyond the scope of our
inquiries.
Naming Rights; refer to agreements under which a private entity pays
a sum of money, usually periodically, over a specified time period, in
exchange for the stadium being designated PNC Park, Coors Field,
Qualcomm Stadium, Tropicana Field. In the section below, the high-
lights of the Steelers lease present an extended essay on naming rights,
which I consider one of the most significant and most widely ignored
matters addressed by our work. I encourage the reader to give this a
close look.
Enhanced Seating; includes luxury boxes and suites, club seats, and
also private or preferred seat licenses (PSL). This is a payment by a fan,
in the nature of a license, which gives the fan the privilege to buy a sea-
son ticket or club seating. Where a lease provides for a sharing of reve-
nues from an in-stadium bar, restaurant, club, etcetera, we included it
under this category, primarily for lack of a better place. See "Gate"
above, for a discussion of the accounting treatment on premium seating,
i.e., allocation of a portion of the price for base admission versus pre-
mium component.
Non-Game Events; can take several forms. Generally they are every-
thing except regular season and play-off games, and events immediately
preceding or following such, and directly related thereto, or required by
MLB or NFL rules. As such, non-game events can be sponsored by the
teams. They can also be sponsored by the public. These might include
concerts, other sporting events, conventions, and mass meetings. Often
the leases make special provision for "civic," "community," or "special"
events, and set aside a maximum number of these per year, which the
public entity may hold, providing they do not interfere with regularly
2000]
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scheduled games. When considering the various provisions in this cate-
gory in the tables below, the reader must always ask which type of "non-
game event" is referenced. Sometimes the sharing of revenues only oc-
curs with respect to the reserved number of civic events, and not for
other non-MLB or non-NFL events.
Maintenance; has two related meanings as used below, unless the ta-
ble specifically states otherwise. First of all, maintenance retains its com-
mon meaning of those activities which go into keeping the facilities at a
level acceptable for use by the public from day to day: cleaning, trash
removal, grass cutting, and minor repairs for example. Beyond this, we
have also used it in the sense of operating expenses necessary for the
successful functioning of the stadium: utilities, insurance, sales promo-
tion, marketing, advertising costs, private security services, fees to man-
agement firms, fees to concessionaires, and so forth. This does not
include players' salaries, and other team-specific costs.
Capital Improvements; might be summarized as everything that is not
maintenance. Often the team vill dedicate a certain portion of a reve-
nue stream to a "capital reserve fund" for these purposes, with any costs
beyond these dedicated amounts borne by the public. Many leases list
them with a high degree of specificity, in an effort, no doubt, to avoid
argument in future years as to who shall be responsible for their cost.
From a business/tax standpoint, they are an asset, rather than an expen-
diture, that one would tend to depreciate over time, rather than deduct
in a given year. In leases from the early years of the 1990s the public
usually bore these costs. In later leases, one can observe a tendency to
either share these costs between the team and the public, or to make
them the responsibility of the team.
HI. TiH CULTURAL SETr[NG OF OUR WORK
We took great care throughout our work to stress what such a re-
search project could and could not do. We did our best to give policy
makers an accurate survey of stadium lease provisions in the United
States in the 1990s. For our own immediate decisions on the Pittsburgh
Pirates and Steelers, our work showed what existed elsewhere. It
showed what was at least conceivable in Pittsburgh at the close of the
twentieth-century. Beyond this, comparative research, while promising
the moon, may only deliver moonbeams.'
8. In framing my own thoughts in this regard I was helped greatly by Mark Rosentraub's
frank and insightful discussion of the "Sports Culture" in his book. See MARK RosENTRAtB,
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Every city has its own story to tell. The chapters of those stories
include: the relative bargaining strength of the parties concerned, the
extent of the public subsidy and the many forms it takes; the size of the
private contribution; whether the city is getting an expansion team;9 the
scope of the city's, or county's, or state's taxing power; the extent to
which the team has imbedded itself within the locality's identity, self im-
age, and cultural consciousness; 10 the desires, demands, and whims of
those who control MiLB; the federal antitrust exemption which allows
team owners to take open, concerted, anti-competitive action in restraint
of trade, and artificially limit the number of franchises thus forcing the
great urban centers of this country to engage in destructive bidding wars;
and so on and so forth.
Consider Charlotte, North Carolina for example. The Carolina
Panthers pay one dollar per year in rent, and get 100% of the gate, con-
cessions, advertising, broadcasting, naming rights, and premium seating.
They control and retain all revenues from all events at Ericsson Stadium.
The public is responsible for all capital improvements and probably over
half of the maintenance. At first glance, it looks like a very pro-team,
sweetheart deal. But look again. Charlotte never had and desperately
wanted an NFL franchise. The private ownership group raised approxi-
mately $200 million demanded by the NFL for an expansion team, from
$140 million cash, plus $60 million foregone NFL broadcasting revenue
over three years. Then they put $187 million of their own money into
the new stadium. Their lease might be a good lease in Charlotte. The
same lease, or one with comparable provisions, might be a very bad lease
in Pittsburgh, with an established, successful football market, no
franchise expansion fee, and two-thirds of the $233 million stadium con-
struction costs, not to mention all site-acquisition, demolition, and infra-
structure, borne by the public."
MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS: THE REAL CosT OF SPORTS AND WHO'S PAYING FOR IT 30-73
(1997) (especially Chapter Two, "Why Are Sports So Important to So Many People?" ).
9. In which case the new ownership group may have raised a significant franchise fee in
the neighborhood of $100-200 million for most of the new teams in our study; and which
recently hit the $700 million mark for the new Houston NFL franchise.
10. See ROSENTRAuB, supra note 8.
11. This was not the first time I had expressed doubts on the cogency of the motives and
assumptions underlying much of today's comparative research, so fashionable among the ur-
ban growth coalitions of editorial boards, corporate boosters, and "economic development
professionals," who often steer so much of the public debate. As I stated in 1996,
comparisons with other cities or school districts, though highly fashionable lately...
have a dubious value. The conclusions that they purport to prove are colored by both
the initial selection of the cities to compare Pittsburgh with, as well as a selective filter-
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Accordingly, we made no attempt to "rate" any of the leases in our
survey as good, bad, pro-public hard-bargaining deals, pro-team sweet-
heart deals, fiscally sound, fiscally irresponsible, or anti-taxpayer. Such
comparisons create more questions than they answer. Elected officials
in those cities played the hand they were dealt. Often it was a very bad
hand. Often they played that bad hand badly, in the face of deafening,
impassioned public outcry. In the absence of authentic legislative
change at the Federal level (unlikely) or seismic shifts in the role of
sports in American culture (unimaginable in the short term), many more
cities will soon have their own stories to tell.
Having said all this, we held out the quixotic hope that perhaps,
against all odds, some way existed by which Pittsburgh could buck this
trend. Could some set of unique circumstances here enable us to rise
where other cities had sunk or merely treaded water? Could we learn
from mistakes made in other places? Could we parlay the bad hand we
had been dealt into a full house, or would it ultimately prove to be aces
and eights? Would it be the dead man's hand?
IV. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PiRATEs LEASE COMPARISON
A. Rent
Perhaps nothing better illustrated the limitations of comparative re-
search than our comparative remarks on rent in the Pirates study. Look-
ing at "base rents" only, for the Pirates and the seven other teams that
committed to a stated, numerical base rent, we noted that the Pirates'
figure of $100,000.00 was the lowest. Next was Oakland's $250,000.00;
Kansas City's $450,000.00; Atlanta's $500,000.00; Seattle's $700,000.00;
Arizona's $1 million; Texas' $2 million; and Houston's $3.4 million.'2
ing-out of the myriad local conditions in the comparison communities that account for
the variances.
Performance Audit, PrrrsBURGH BOARD OF EDUCATION 12, n.4 (1996).
And in the City Controller's Office in 1999 1 opined:
Strangely, much of today's fashionable locational research largely ignores this group
[Pittsburgh City residents]. Well-meaning consultants run to a handful of "hot" locales
to ask "What's wrong with us?" of highly-compensated young people, starting or pre-
paring to start families. The resulting work product encourages a municipal inferiority
complex: Admonishing us to change into something we cannot become, in order to
attract a demographic whose propensity for the suburban lifestyle is, arguably, one of
the best documented social trends of the second half of the 20th Century.
Special Report, Nn~w HOmOWNER Suvny 4, n.6 (1997-1998).
12. See Appendix, MLB Comparison Table, Rent.
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But when we considered the yearly payments, which all sixteen teams
had committed to pay their respective public entities, it became impossi-
ble to predict exactly how much this "expanded" definition of rent
would actually bring in for each of the cities in our comparison. It is safe
to say that most would not pay more than Houston; and most would not
pay less than Pittsburgh, but beyond this, the certainty ended."3
B. Non-Game Day Revenues
Between the date of the initial Memorandum of Understanding, Oc-
tober 28, 1998, and the proposed lease, March 25, 1999, used in our
study, the Pirates did two things with respect to this category. First, they
dropped their demand to keep 100% of all non-MLB event revenues,
coming down to 85%. Second, they proposed giving the 5% ticket
surcharge proceeds for non-MLB events to the public as rent.' This
ticket surcharge offer covers all non-MLB events, those sponsored by
the Pirates as well as those sponsored by the public. In addition, the
lease provides for up to five non-MLB events, which the Authority can
schedule, and another five for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. At
these ten events, the Authority or the State will keep all net revenues
from the gate and concessions. 15
13. The Colorado Rockies, for example, committed to a "minimum yearly payment" of
$100,000.00, but this will probably be exceeded, at least in the early years of their lease. In
contrast, the Pirates' "break-point" of $44.5 million paid attendance, which must be reached
before the public shares in any excess gate, is probably too optimistic, even in a good year at a
new facility. A second example: on its face, the revenue sharing arrangement at Camden
Yards (Baltimore) definitely appeared to have the potential to generate more than Houston's
$3.4 million base rent, but whether this is obtained in any given year depends upon attendance
levels and many other variables. Similar qualifications could be made for the other cities. We
felt the Pirates could pay more in base rent, without placing their economic viability in jeop-
ardy, and suggested that if the public were able to increase this base rent, or to lower the
excess gate break-point, the resulting additional amounts should be dedicated to capital
improvements.
14. In the absence of this provision, all ticket surcharge proceeds would have gone to the
Team up to the first $1.5 million (which computes to a paid attendance threshold of $30 mil-
lion); the next $375,000.00 is to go to the capital reserve fund; after that, the team would have
kept the rest. This new provision essentially removed the "gate" at all non-MLB events from
the base amount upon which the team's first $1.5 million is calculated; and it further ensured
that 5% of the gate at non-MLB events will go directly to the capital reserve fund, even in
those years when the $30 million paid attendance threshold is not met.
15. It is important to note that major concerts such as the Rolling Stones, and U2, that
draw sell-out crowds will almost certainly be team sponsored non-MLB events. As we will see
below, this issue was more hotly contested with respect to the proposed Steelers lease, since a
football stadium tends to have many more seats, and many more days of non-use during nice
weather, than a baseball park.
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Looking just at team sponsored non-MLB events, if we take 10% off
the top of the gate, (5% amusement tax and 5% ticket surcharge), and
take 15% of the remaining 80%, (which computes to 12% of the total
gate), the net effect would be for the public to receive 22% of the gate
for these events. If the 5% ticket surcharge dedicated to capital im-
provements is not included as money to the public, then the share of the
gate is 17%. Looking around the country, we noted this was not as good
as some, but quite a bit better than others. It was certainly a reasonable
starting point, especially in light of the City's relatively high, 31% park-
ing tax.
Whether the public focused on increasing its share of team sponsored
non-MLB events, or on trying to tap into other income streams currently
reserved by the team, for instance luxury suites, club seats, advertising
and concessions, we recommended once again, that any such additional
amounts be dedicated to capital improvements. This changed the discus-
sion from a local government's attempt to "cut the rug" a little more to
its liking, and placed it in the context of a responsible effort to cap the
extent and nature of the public subsidy. It recognized the need for the
team to remain economically viable, while attempting to enlist that via-
bility to freeze the public subsidy at the levels contemplated in the Plan
B 1999 promises, described above.
C. Parking
Our conclusions and recommendations in this regard were virtually
identical for both the Pirates and the Steelers. I present them together
in this single section.
The City of Pittsburgh is supposed to receive thirty-one cents on
every dollar paid by any patron of a parking lot or garage within its mu-
nicipal boundaries. As far as the new stadiums go, the question is who
gets the other sixty-nine cents? The ultimate configuration of the park-
ing question, for both the Pirates and the Steelers is still, at the time of
this writing, the subject of partially completed, complex negotiations
among several public entities, private lot owners and operators, prospec-
tive developers, and the teams. It encompasses new surrounding lots,
purchasing and/or transferring existing ownership and lease rights in
present lots to other lots or garages nearby, the planned construction of
one or more parking garages and future development scenarios for ho-
tels and entertainment complexes. In our opinion, the party that ulti-
mately gets what is left of that sixty-nine cents, after paying employees,
maintenance, utilities, insurance, and other costs, was far less important
than what happens to the thirty-one cents payable off the top to the City
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of Pittsburgh. As the chief fiscal watchdog of the City, the Controller
did not want to see it tied up and dedicated to any stadium-specific pur-
poses such as capital improvements. He wanted it to flow, freely and
fully, into the general fund of the City.16
We stated our rationale for this as follows: because the new stadiums
will be owned by a quasi-governmental entity - the Authority - the new
Pirates baseball park and the new Steelers stadium will not pay real es-
tate taxes to their host municipality, the City of Pittsburgh, nor to the
Pittsburgh School District, or to Allegheny County for that matter. Yet,
they will depend upon good roads, bridges, traffic control, snow removal,
police officers, fire fighters, and paramedics. The continued economic
viability of the teams depends, to a great extent, on the continued ability
of city hall to deliver core municipal services. As we noted above, we
tried to take a positive approach in our studies, hoping that some unique
set of circumstances here in Pittsburgh might converge and enable us to
rise above the depressing consensus of most scholars who have studied
public subsidies of sports teams in any depth and with any degree of
objectivity.17 Still, we wanted our readers to appreciate the possibility
that the most the public may ever realize from these projects will be a
16. In Pennsylvania, as in several other states, another way to tie up future revenue
streams is tax increment financing, or "TIFs." See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6930.1(1990). Under
this relatively new star in the economic development firmament a private developer continues
to pay real estate tax to the host municipality on the property in question, but this tax is frozen
at pre-development, assessed values. As the project takes shape the real estate appreciates in
value. The developer is allowed to take the additional tax liability, attributable to the in-
creased value created by the public/private investment, i.e., the "tax increment," and apply all
or some portion of it to pay off the costs of construction, usually in the form of periodic bond
amortization payments. The public foregoes the future, increased real estate tax revenues
during the life of the project, typically fifteen to twenty years. Currently in Pittsburgh, a de-
bate rages around the use of TIFs. Proponents of this technique argue that the only thing the
public is really losing is the increment or the "new" tax dollars that absent the TIEF, would not
exist. Critics of TIFs frequently find themselves insisting that the development would have
happened anyway, making the TIF just the latest example of needless corporate welfare. The
laws creating TIFs often feed into this, in my view, false dichotomy by requiring a "but for"
determination by the legislative body of the host municipality, i.e., but for the TIF, the new
development project would not proceed. It is a good example of a law designed to make liars
of us all. Predictably, wealthy developers who come into distressed urban areas, with their
allies in the media and in the halls of municipal governance, are usually able to convince
enough people that they will not invest in the absence of the TIF. I believe a better approach
is to trash the "but for" requirement, and free the local legislators and the public they repre-
sent from what, in the end, often comes down to a metaphysical dispute. Remove the discus-
sion from the context of fear, from threats to leave, credible or disingenuous, and from
morose descriptions of blight attendant upon the "but for" analysis, and let the proposed
project stand or fall on its own, intrinsic merits.
17. See A'DREw ZnmALiST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS (1992); RoSENrRAum, supra note
8; SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXEs: THE ECONOMIC IMPACr OF SPORTS TEAMs AND STADIuMs
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two or three year bump in the parking tax and amusement tax. We
warned that we should not give this away too.18
Over the last fifty years, the Public Parking Authority of Pittsburgh
has amassed an impressive record in building, managing, and operating
parking facilities. This brainchild of legendary Pittsburgh Mayor, Davey
Lawrence, has not been content to rest on its laurels. 19 It has kept up
with state of the art improvements and technologies, and consistently
provided parking to motorists at competitive, and often below-market,
rates. Beyond covering the debt service and operating costs of the facil-
ity, it has no profit motive. Its board members serve at the pleasure of
the Mayor of Pittsburgh and have a structural incentive to maximize
parking tax collections for the benefit of the City.
We recommended that this entity oversee all parking related matters
at the new Pirates ballpark and the new Steelers stadium. Its oversight
could include the installation of state-of-the-art revenue control equip-
ment at all lots and garages, application of uniform accounting and au-
diting procedures, and intensive field monitoring. These and similar
measures will ensure that the City of Pittsburgh receives its full 31%
parking tax. Although the letter of this recommendation will probably
not be followed, its spirit does seem to be emerging through the complex
maze of Plan B parking negotiations.
D. Capital Improvements
Under the proposed lease with the Pirates for PNC Park, the public
will pay for all capital improvements, over the twenty-nine and one-half
years of the lease, that exceed the amounts in a "capital reserve fund."
This fund is to be started by an initial contribution from the public of $3
million. It must be augmented each year by $650,000.00 to come from
(Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997); Robert A. Baade, Professional Sports as
Catalyst for Metropolitan Economic Development, 18 J. UnB. Am. 1, 1-17 (1996).
18. If parking revenues were to be included in the effort to fund capital improvements
(see below), we stressed that should only take place after the City of Pittsburgh gets its thirty-
one cents on every dollar.
19. A recent consensus of experts has ranked David L. Lawrence number three in the list
of all-time best, big-city mayors in the U.S.A. See MELVIN G. HoLLI, THE AMERICAN MAYOR
(1999). Like so many of the other pieces of Lawrence's legacy, air and water quality control
laws, urban renewal, a robust, colorful, and now vanishing democratic patronage machine, the
public parking authority stands out more clearly with each passing year as a positive example
of public sector intervention in democratic capitalism; Keynes for the common man; a hard-
nosed, sensible buffer protecting the average, working and middle class citizen from the
ravages of an untrammeled free market. I shall have more to say in this regard in the conclud-
ing Consciously Partisan Postscript, infra.
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any combination of the public's share of parking, non-MLB event reve-
nues, a City tax levied on visiting players, or docking rights, and a contin-
gent contribution from the Pirates. It was starting to look to us like most
of the revenue sharing the public might win through bargaining with the
Pirates, was going to be conditioned upon its being rolled back into PNC
Park to cover capital improvements. Meanwhile, what was the team
proposing to put into capital improvements, from its own money?
The Pirates said they would put a maximum of $375,000.00 per year
into this capital reserve fund, but this can only come from the 5% ticket
surcharge, and only if those ticket surcharge proceeds exceed $1.5 mil-
lion per year. This means no team contribution to the capital reserve
fund for any year in which base admission proceeds, what I have been
calling the "gate," do not exceed $30 million. If the team works with an
average ticket price of $10.00, the result is three million fans. An aver-
age ticket price of $15.00 computes to two million fans, and so on. This
may be an overly optimistic estimate from the public's standpoint.20
But, this is only the beginning of the problem. Section 10.3.2 of the pro-
posed lease stated:
Capital Improvements shall constitute all capital modifications or
additions to existing facilities at the Ballpark which (A) have
been installed in at least one-half of MLB stadia, or, in the case of
modifications or additions applicable only to open air-stadia, in at
least one-half of open-air stadia, (B) are reasonably necessary for
the Team to maintain its relative economic position within MLB
with regard to revenues from the Ballpark; and (C) are reason-
ably necessary to prevent the facilities and amenities of the
Ballpark from becoming materially outdated in comparison to
other MLB stadia constructed between 1999 and 2004.
This might be dubbed "the outside consultant full employment
clause." One imagines the sound of one-thousand, ringed binders crash-
ing upon the polished table tops of the conference rooms of those who
know better; as a cadre of high-priced experts, i.e., somebody's college
buddy with a website and a brief case, fall over each other to define
"relative economic position" and "materially outdated" for the benefit
of the skeptical public who must now pay the bill.
20. Pirate attendance figures have fallen from 1990s' paid attendance of approximately
2.3 million and 1991s 2.4 million; to roughly 1.6 million for both 1998 and 1999. This gate
threshold limitation on the Pirates' responsibility for capital improvements will almost cer-
tainly lead to some contribution in the early years of the lease. But what happens if the
novelty of the new ballpark wears off in four or five years? The further out we go into those
twenty-nine and one-half years, the more questionable the team's contribution to capital im-
provements gets.
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A clause like this one explains why a facility like Three Rivers Sta-
dium, which cost $40 million to build in 1968-70 (in 1970 dollars), still
carried in 1999, a bonded indebtedness of over $44 million (in 1999 dol-
lars). 21 It explains with unparalleled clarity why teams insist on leasing
instead of buying. In our most important pronouncement on the Pirates'
lease, we warned that this clause, coupled with the highly contingent Pi-
rate contribution to the capital reserve fund, would ensure a continuing,
open-ended, and ever increasing public subsidy of PNC Park.
To avoid this we recommended that the parties to the lease agree on
a guaranteed yearly team contribution to the capital reserve fund; i.e.,
one that is not contingent upon attendance thresholds, optimistic, con-
servative, or otherwise. This could come from a variety of sources in-
cluding concessions, advertising, broadcasting fees, luxury suites, club
seats, PSLs, the team's gate from non-MLB events, or the team's parking
revenues. Thus reconstituted, any capital improvements exceeding
amounts in the capital reserve fund should be the responsibility of the
team. Decisions on the necessity of capital improvements could then be
shared with the Pirates, since the team could reasonably be expected to
be more conservative with its own money.
We felt that if the public succeeded in obtaining this adequate, guar-
anteed, yearly contribution to the capital reserve fund from the Pirates,
plus an explicit statement in the lease that any capital improvements ex-
ceeding amounts in the capital reserve fund would be the responsibility
of the team, then the danger implicit in provisions like Section 10.3.2 of
the proposed lease quoted above, would be greatly diminished. But if
the public was not able to obtain such commitments, then we strongly
warned that any such provision that seeks to set the definition of capital
improvement in stone, and tag it to whatever a given percentage of other
teams decide to do, should be deleted from the lease, and the public
should retain the right and power to approve any contemplated capital
improvements.
Here is where the giant lies sleeping, concealed in the tangled verbi-
age of "maintenance" versus "capital improvement" provisions. In the
absence of changes like those suggested above, he will wake in distant
years and wreak taxpayer-subsidized havoc on the best-laid plans of
lease drafters.
21. Similarly, Section 10.13 of the proposed lease, provides for a "market study" of lux-
ury and premium seating.
[Vol. 10:237
THE STADIUM GAME PITTSBURGH STYLE
V. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE STEELERS LEASE COMPARISON
A. Cost Overruns
As noted above, both Pittsburgh teams promised they would be re-
sponsible for any cost overruns on the actual stadium construction.22
The Steelers, however, attempted to insert a provision that would give
them a credit against future rents for any cost overruns they have to
cover. With a yearly rent of $250,000.00, the practical effect of this, for
example on a 1% cost overrun ($2.33 million on a total construction esti-
mate of $233 million; a very realistic possibility) would be to exempt
them from rent for almost nine years; a 2% cost overrun shields them
from eighteen years of rent and so on. 3
We did not find a cost overruns provision similar to this in any of the
documents we examined from our thirteen NFL comparison cities.
Although we recommended that it be deleted from the final lease, we
pointed out in the interests of fairness and context that only five, or per-
haps six teams in the thirteen NFL cities committed to cover cost over-
runs at all. In two cities the cost overruns issue did not apply and in the
other five, or perhaps six, the public covered them.
22. Once again I remind the reader that actual stadium construction costs will almost
never include the vast array of infrastructure readiness expenditures borne by the public that
make stadia construction possible. These include demolition and site clearance, eminent do-
main costs, relocation of existing property owners and tenants, roads, water and sewer lines,
engineering, environmental assessments, frequently, architectural services, construction of
new or expanded parking facilities, and so forth.
23. In Pittsburgh we have a fairly typical demarcation between our two daily papers. An
older, established, hometown, token-liberal, corporate-centrist-booster paper competes for
the soul of the reading public with a newer, leaner, meaner, right-wing paper financed by an
eccentric billionaire. This new kid on the block gained points, and perhaps a few readers, by
steadfastly opposing both attempts to publicly finance the new stadiums, the failed Regional
Renaissance Partnership, and Plan B, and most relevant to the accompanying text, constantly
pointed out the Steelers phony commitment on cost overruns. In so doing, it combined a
refreshing counterpoint to the reigning media mantra with an editorial catechism that views
anything attempted since the death of Herbert Spencer as a failed social experiment, espe-
cially if the experiment has even a snowball's chance in Hell of salvaging the urban core at the
expense of an encircling, white, republican suburbia. Meanwhile its rival, the corporate-cen-
trist paper, gravely assumed the thankless task of enlightening the narrow-minded, encourag-
ing the wavering, and scolding the parochial and provincial, particularly if they were elected
officials attempting to respond, even half-heartedly, to the incessant screams of the majority of
their constituents.
If you can maintain a sense of distance, and a sense of humor, the whole thing gets on
tolerably well. Alcohol helps.
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B. Naming Rights
In our research, we found that of the thirteen NFL comparison cities,
Jacksonville and St. Louis had somehow withstood the pressure to give
100% of the revenues from naming rights to the teams. This fortitude is
not widespread in the NFL, but it does exist. In Pittsburgh, however, the
Pirates are expecting 100%. The Steelers, after some initial talk about
"Rooney Field," soon acknowledged that they too were leaning toward a
naming rights deal of their own. Those negotiating the leases simply as-
sumed that the teams should receive 100% of these revenues. We sug-
gested, in an extended essay, that they re-examine this assumption. This
was my favorite part of our whole stadium lease comparison job. Every-
one involved with the lease negotiations dismissed it out-of-hand, ridi-
culed it, or ignored it. For this reason the following repeats this essay in
all essential respects.
We believe we must engage in a discussion of naming rights at a more
fundamental level. Our efforts in this regard bear an uncanny resem-
blance to an essay by Heidegger. We are not really asking a question,
much less giving an answer. Rather, we are attempting to return to a
distant point, from which the asking of a question may again, one day,
become an authentic possibility. We are called upon to recommend a
course of action to follow, yet we find ourselves thrown into a situation
where all the dispositive assumptions have already been made by others
whom we do not know, without our knowledge, participation or consent.
Case in point: PNC Park. The sole entity with the power to dispose
of naming rights, or any other rights for that matter, with respect to a
new ballpark for the Pirates is the five-member Board of the Authority.
This Authority will build and own the new ballpark. At least 80% of the
actual construction costs will be borne by the public, and this does not
include off-site infrastructure, site clearance, and a host of other pre-
construction architectural, environmental, engineering, and consulting
costs, 100% of which are paid for with public money.
Furthermore, the sole method for the Authority to exercise its power
to dispose of the naming rights will be official action taken by it in the
form of a resolution adopting a lease that contains a naming rights
clause. It can only do this at a regular or special meeting, duly adver-
tised and open to the public. This still had not happened by the end of
October, 1999. At this point a series of intriguing procedural questions
arose. What is the meaning of the PNC Park naming rights deal an-
nounced in August of 1998? Who made this deal from the standpoint of
the public? Who made the decision to give the Pirates 100%? What was
the basis for the assumption that the public fronting 80% of the con-
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struction costs for the new park had no arguable claim to a percentage of
the naming rights revenues on its own park?24
Perhaps we must contend with a reality even more "Heideggerian"
than we dreamed, one in which we approach the frontiers of a novel
conception of time itself. A universe where missing steps do not so
much occur as unfold. Or, perhaps less metaphysical, more mundane
explanations suggest themselves to the reader at this juncture. But, un-
fortunately, this wrinkle in time, this advance placement of the naming
rights rabbit in the private hat, is only the beginning of the problem. In
reading the comments of those closest to the negotiations, one cannot
help but come away with the impression that most of the public's repre-
sentatives simply assume, ab initio, that the possession and disposition of
naming rights is the exclusive province of the teams.
It is one thing to bargain away a right that everyone acknowledges
one party to the transaction, in this case the public, originally possesses.
It is quite another matter to be and remain unaware that you are in fact,
losing something.
This lack of awareness on the issue of naming rights is indicative of a
mindset that pervades much of the stadium-finance discussion. Appar-
ently the public is to act in a bold, innovative, entrepreneurial fashion
when assuming financial risk, but not when it comes to sharing in the
profits its investment makes possible. Those holding a contrary view
have not been asked to help draft the leases.'
Moreover, this lack of awareness does not bode well for the future.
It has already spawned questionable progeny. The case of PNC Park is
once again illustrative. What happened once the Pirates were allowed to
act as though they, and they alone, possessed exclusive jurisdiction over
naming rights? The answer is that they sold them to a member of their
ownership group. They will get $30 million over twenty years, of which
$1.4 million per year, over the life of the twenty-nine and one-half year
lease, will be called a team contribution to construction costs. The
Tampa Bay Buccaneers will get $39 million in just thirteen years from
24. These are not new questions. Sports and Exhibition Authority Board Member, and
City Councilman, Dan Cohen asked a similar question in November of 1997, when the Pen-
guins announced they were negotiating a naming rights deal with Allegheny Energy for the
Civic Arena. The Penguins seemed to accept in principle the idea that the Authority had
some rights in the proposed deal. The whole issue was eclipsed in October of 1998, when the
Penguins filed for bankruptcy.
25. And so the public pays for land-acquisition, site clearance, infrastructure, engineering,
environmental, and architectural costs, and the lion's share of the actual stadium construction.
In return for this it gets the very non-entrepreneurial promise of increased taxes.
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Raymond James Financial. The Baltimore Ravens could get as much as
$100 million over twenty years from PSINet for naming rights and re-
lated "tie-ins."26 Could the Pirates have gotten more? Did they want
more from their co-owner?2 7
Admittedly, these are not the sort of questions one feels comfortable
raising in polite company. But, at the risk of belaboring the point, we
stand now on the threshold of a public spending program of unprece-
dented magnitude; an $800 million to $1 billion public bond issue for two
stadia and an expanded convention center, with a new arena for the
Pittsburgh Penguins of the National Hockey League (NHL) conceivably
in the wings. Meanwhile, as we write these words, the law firms hired by
the Authority, at a minimum of $600,000.00 to negotiate the leases, are
foreclosing, for twenty-nine and one-half years, the public's legitimate
claims in naming rights by handing over to the teams plenary discretion
over this new and promising arrival on the stadium-financing scene,
whose prodigious revenue generating power is only beginning to be un-
derstood and developed.8 And, this is happening in the absence of pub-
lic input and comment, outside the purview of the Sunshine Act because
it involves "an interest in real estate."
Those individuals and law firms representing the public's interests in
the negotiations with both the Pirates and the Steelers, should start from
26. The Steelers naming rights deal on the horizon, brokered under the auspices of NFL
Properties, a league entity created, in part, by the Rooneys, Steelers owners', with virtually
unlimited potential for the licensing and marketing of not only the Steelers name and logo,
but those of the NFL and its teams as well, could be the biggest deal yet. See Suzanne Elliott
& Patty Tascarella, Steelers Close in on Stadium Naming Rights Deal, PrrrsBURGH Bus. TimEs
(June 18, 1999) <http://www.amcity.com/pittsburgh /stories/19991 11/29/storyl.html>.
27. These serious reservations with respect to PNC Park are, at least partially, mitigated
in the minds of some by the fact that for the last eighteen years the problem has been saving
the Pirates. Plan B and all its predecessors-lease concessions to the Galbraith interests in the
early-1980s, the failed attempt to sell Three Rivers Stadium circa 1985, the public-private part-
nership of corporate ownership, the $20 million URA loan to the Pirates, and even the
doomed Regional Renaissance Initiative 12% sales tax-all arose from this premise. No simi-
lar compelling conditions exist with respect to the Steelers. They are not a struggling
franchise. Their fan support is the stuff of legends. To many, a second stadium for the
Steelers appears as a puzzling after-thought.
28. This holds true not only for stadium-naming rights. The future is sure to contain deals
for advertising on helmets, shoulder patches, and other equipment, wherein each player be-
comes, in essence, a human billboard for the national and international, viewing audience.
Also, if present trends hold, it is not inconceivable that we will soon witness naming rights
deals for the teams themselves. It is a short leap from "PSINet Stadium at Camden Yards" to
"the PSINet Ravens." The teams will certainly claim that they should receive 100% of these
team-specific advertising revenues, i.e., human billboards and the replacement of geographical
location with corporate sponsors. All the more reason why the public should retain naming
rights to the venues that the public builds and owns.
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the position that naming rights over the new stadia belong to the public.
They should strive to retain an equitable percentage of this revenue
stream for the benefit of the public.
The Steelers owners have stated that they offered to increase their
contribution to stadium construction costs from $50 million to $76.5 mil-
lion based on the promise that they would be given 100% of any stadium
naming rights. If this is so, they should have no objection to a reduction
of their contribution back down to the original $50 million, with the Pub-
lic retaining one hundred percent of the naming rights.2 9
C. Non-Game Day Revenues
Our thinking in this area followed closely along the lines of what we
said on this issue in the Pirates Report. Once again, the Pittsburgh team
wassomewhere in the middle, with some cities giving almost everything
to the team and some keeping almost everything for the public, often
depending in large part on the type of facility, single purpose, dual pur-
pose, or multi-use. Once again, we noted that the City of Pittsburgh
would already be getting 31% off the top from all parking at these
"other events" and the 5% amusement tax, off the top, from all ticket
purchases. We also assumed that the 5% ticket surcharge would apply to
these other events. Under these circumstances, the public's promised
share of 15% of "event-specific net revenues" at team-sponsored con-
certs and other non-sporting events sounded like a pretty reasonable of-
fer. If the public wanted to try and get a bigger share of these revenues
from the Steelers, that was fine with us. But that was a matter, we be-
lieved, for the give and take of the bargaining sessions, and not one
fraught with major policy considerations, which was the case, in our
opinion, for naming rights.
But alas, it was not to be that simple. As the reader can see, the
Steelers' offer of 15% of event specific net revenues only covered non-
sporting events. Meanwhile, the Steelers had struck a side deal with the
University of Pittsburgh that agreed to hold Pittsburgh Panther (Pitt)
football games in the new Steelers stadium. The Steelers did not want to
share anything they made on Pitt games with the public. This left a gap-
ing and very lucrative hole in the proffered 15%.30 We released our re-
29. The vehemence with which the Steelers owners will resist such a proposal should serve
as one indicator, among many, that the public is on the verge of losing or giving away, a
revenue stream worth well in excess of $26 million.
30. This stance on the part of the Steelers was one of the main sticking points for Council-
man Dan Cohen, who, as mentioned above, had initiated the City Council's request for our
lease comparisons, and who also served on the Board of the Sports and Exhibition Authority.
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port on the Steelers lease on June 11, 1999. Overnight it seemed,
billboards and bus signs appeared with the message: "Sundays Sold Out.
Saturdays ... Not Yet." In other words, the Steelers NFL games were
sold out well into the future, but a disappointed football fan could still
enjoy the new stadium by purchasing tickets to a Pitt Panther game.
D. Capital Improvements
Here, we departed from our Cassandra-like prophecies and actually
highlighted some good news. Under the proposed terms for the new
Steelers stadium, the public will pay for all capital improvements that
exceed the amounts in the capital reserve fund. This fund is to be started
by an initial contribution from the public of $3 million out of the pro-
ceeds of the Plan B construction bond issue. The Memorandum of In-
tent, which we used for our report, was silent on any mandatory annual
addition to this fund, which, in the case of the Pirates, is to be
$650,000.00 per year. The Steelers proposed to contribute each year to
this capital reserve fund all 5% ticket surcharge proceeds in excess of
$1.4 million. They will be using the first $1.4 million to amortize a por-
tion of the original construction bond, floated to build their new sta-
dium. The reader may recall the Pirates made a similar promise, capped
at $375,000.00 per year. To the best of our knowledge, the Steelers did
not insist on such a cap
Thus, the Steelers, i.e., the fans through the ticket surcharge, begin to
contribute to capital improvements once the gate reaches $28 million at
the new Steelers' stadium. As noted above in our report on the Pirates,
we expressed grave reservations about their highly contingent capital re-
serve fund contributions, based as they were on overly optimistic attend-
ance thresholds. We did not have similar fears with respect to the
Steelers, provided the capital improvement provisions in the final lease
continued to embody the arrangement envisioned by the Memorandum
of Intent, especially the absence of a cap on ticket surcharge proceeds
going into the capital reserve fund. We based this conclusion on the fol-
lowing analysis.
Western Pennsylvania is a strong football market. Based on past ex-
perience and their present success in marketing new PSLs, the Steelers
should have no problem attracting near-capacity crowds for the foresee-
Throughout the lease negotiations he repeatedly pressed for a share of the Steelers revenues
from their deal with the Pitt Panthers. We wished Councilman Cohen well in his persistent
effort to get a piece of these Pitt games for the public. But as of this writing, neither the
Steelers nor Pitt have budged.
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able future. Their new stadium plans call for a seating capacity of ap-
proximately 65,000. If we take a conservative estimate of 60,000 paid
attendance per ten home dates, eight regular season games and two pre-
season games, then multiply this by an average, new-stadium ticket price
of $45.00, we get a gate of $27 million. Just a few more fans per game, or
just a slightly higher average ticket price at the new stadium, and we
reach the $28 million threshold on the strength of home games alone. 1
Assuming 63,000 paid attendance at an average ticket price of $50.00
computes to a gate of $31.5 million, and so on. A realistic estimate of
the home-game gate could be somewhere in the neighborhood of $30
million, which would ensure a yearly contribution of $100,000.00 ($2 mil-
lion times 5%) into the capital reserve fund, and we have not even con-
sidered other events.
In past years, major concerts at Three Rivers Stadium such as U2, the
Rolling Stones, and the Grateful Dead have been sell-out or near sell-
out affairs, and there is no reason to think this trend could not continue.
The stadium will stand empty and unused most of the time during four to
six months of good weather. A concert at the new stadium attracting
50,000 fans at $30.00 per ticket generates a gate of $1.5 million. Do this
four times in a year and you have $6 million.3' Adding this to our esti-
mate of $30 million for the home-game gate, we get $36 million, which is
$8 million above the threshold, resulting in a yearly team contribution of
$400,000.00 to the capital reserve fund. Two home play-off games in a
successful season could generate an additional team contribution to-
wards capital improvements of $390,000.00.13
But there is even more. As noted above, the University of Pitts-
burgh Panthers have an agreement with the Steelers to play all or most
of their home football games at the new stadium. Pitt's paid attendance
for their seven home games of the 1998 season stood at approximately
287,000 persons. If we multiply this by an average ticket price of $20.00,
we arrive at a total gate of $5.74 million, which, when multiplied by the
5% ticket surcharge, computes back down to another $287,000.00 contri-
bution to the capital reserve fund.
31. And we reiterate that these are conservative estimates all around. Average ticket
prices at the new stadium could easily exceed $50.00. Furthermore, this does not include play-
off games, which would certainly be sold-out and command higher average ticket prices.
32. Or hold eight events drawing 25,000 people at $30.00 each; or sixteen events drawing
25,000 people at $15.00 each; and so on.
33. Reached by calculating the sum of 65,000 fans times $60.00 per ticket, equaling $3.9
million at the gate, times 2 games.
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So, unlike the Pirates arrangement, where we warned of the likeli-
hood of an open-ended public subsidy due to the highly contingent team
contribution to capital improvements; here, with respect to the Steelers,
we believed the proposed lease, with the two additions suggested below,
will adequately fund capital improvements through yearly team contri-
butions, after the initial $3 million deposit of Plan B bond proceeds, thus
avoiding an open-ended public subsidy.
We made the following recommendations to further ensure this goal.
First, the parties to the lease should agree upon a minimum, guaranteed,
yearly Steelers contribution to the capital reserve fund, in an amount
that will cover reasonably foreseeable capital improvement needs over
the life of the lease when added to the initial public contribution of $3
million from the Plan B bond proceeds. If, in any particular year, the
proceeds from the ticket surcharge should prove inadequate to reach this
guaranteed amount, the Steelers should make up the difference from
other revenues. Such back-up revenue streams could include conces-
sions, advertising, enhanced seating, and the Steelers' share of non-game
event revenues or parking revenues. Second, any capital improvements
exceeding amounts in the capital reserve fund should be the responsibil-
ity of the team.
VI. CONSCIOUSLY PARTISAN POSTSCRIPT
Many great evils begin with an assault on language. The first war is
always a war of words. Long before arrows, cannon balls, or cruise mis-
siles can fly, a volley of confusion must de-stabilize the mental land-
scape. I would like to talk about two examples of this phenomenon by
examining the divergent careers of two concepts: (1) politics; and (2)
economic development. What does any of this have to do with the sta-
dium game? Maybe a lot more than you think. Hold on for a few
paragraphs!
Try to remember the last time you heard anyone use the phrase
"good politics" or "good politician." Conversely, can you think of one
time in the last twenty years when any person, corporate executive, labor
leader, elected official, editorial writer, university professor, think tank
pundit, housewife paused, even briefly, to question the value of "eco-
nomic development" or "growth? 34
34. The nearest thing I can think of in this respect are the groans of affluent suburbanites
over sprawl, in other words, a complaint about certain effects of growth: it's over-burdening
our sewer system; it's destroying the rural character, and real estate value of our home; I
moved here to get away from all that, and, often, all them. These protestations merely present
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"Politics" is now uniformly bad. Economic development is always
good. One who attempts to reinstate a different normative scheme, i.e.,
good politics versus bad politics, good growth versus bad growth, finds
less and less room in the marketplace of ideas to make his stand. Like a
bewildered shadow boxer, he stalks an elusive foe. The confrontation,
on those increasingly rare occasions when the enemy deigns to risk a
pitched battle, will not take the form of a frank, point-by-point rebuttal
on the merits. It will look much more like a polite, though somewhat
condescending opacity; the part-conscious, largely unconscious atrophy
of a requisite mental category. To this will be added the even more ef-
fective deterrents of bad taste, embarrassment, and a modern variant of
heresy. In short, the propaganda war or the war of words has been won,
perhaps fifty years ago, perhaps one hundred years ago.
Politics is now synonymous with everything we do not like about
everything else. If your friend does not get that promotion at the plant,
it is politics. When the university professor is denied tenure, it is politics.
When the managing editor at the daily news prints your remarks out of
context, it is just politics. Associate attorneys will never become part-
ners in the firm because of politics. You cannot get your alley paved
because of politics. Your kid is failing algebra, but it is just a lot of poli-
tics. Local, state, and federal legislators accuse their opponents of play-
ing politics. Mayors, governors, and presidents vow to get politics out of
the business of government.3 5 And, candidates inundate you with direct
mail and television ads, urging you to elect them to political office be-
cause they are not politicians.
Politics is surrounded by a cluster of equally odious terms. Politics is
partisan politics, petty politics, divisive politics, parochial politics,
smoke-filled-back-room politics, selfish, childish, narrow-minded, short-
sighted, dirty politics. 36
the ironic corollary of our faith in growth. They are light years away from a genuine critique
of the inherent value of economic development.
35. Hence the contemporary faith in privatization as a panacea for public sector ills, and
its concomitant replacement of blue collar patronage with white collar or pinstripe patronage.
Money remains the milk of electoral politics. The high costs of media attack ads coupled with
Congress' inaction on genuine campaign finance reform will ensure this central and growing
role of money into the foreseeable future. As self-adulating reformers and TV-news "I-
Teams" hammer the last nails into the coffins of the payrollers, ward heelers, and time-farmers
of America, the new, private beneficiaries of the reinvention of government are only too glad
to kick back a percentage of their public contracts in the form of perfectly legal campaign
contributions.
36. See CHRISTOPHER HrrcHENS, No ONE LEFr To LIE To: Tim TRIANGULATIONS OF
WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON (1999).
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Business and civic leaders plan; politicians bicker. Business and civic
leaders create jobs; politicians meddle. Business and civic leaders serve
their customers and shareholders. Politicians grab pork.
"Growth," on the other hand, has only good angels to commend it to
the public psyche. Growth is bi-partisan, rational, non-controversial,
professional, and responsible. Growth is the province of the experts. In
place of partisan bickering, growth builds consensus, i.e., a common
mind-a thinking together. Those who oppose growth are populists,
demagogues, pandering for votes, engaging in class warfare, obstruction-
ists, Luddites. Growth, has become synonymous with progress, a simi-
larly amorphous, undefined, and unchallengeable concept, and we had
better not stand in the way of either of these two juggernauts.
Now back to the stadium game. In my reading, I have encountered
many insightful answers to the question of how we got into this present,
stadium finance mess. 17 These answers include the federal antitrust ex-
emption for professional sports, which allows team owners to take con-
certed action designed to force cities into competitive bidding wars;
federal tax law; revenue sharing arrangements within the leagues; play-
ers' unions and players' salaries; the impact of new revenue streams like
sky boxes, naming rights, and mega-broadcasting deals, on a team's abil-
ity to buy and field the best players; the place of sports in American
popular culture; and so forth. All this is true. But, I have yet to see the
question analyzed in the classical political sense as a decline in urban
power. When the roles of elected officials are examined, it is usually to
note things like their captivity to the wealth and prestige of the sports
lobby; or how they fail to effect meaningful change at the federal level;
or how they cave in, at the local level, to stadium boosters and growth
coalitions, editorial boards, other local media, real estate speculators, de-
velopers, construction firms, building trade unions, and the corporate
community. But why do they cave in? Why do state legislators repre-
senting urban districts, city council members, mayors, county commis-
sioners and executives, routinely fall into line, or fall like a house of
I find it amusing that those who incessantly urge us to be non-partisan never take the next
step and explicitly embrace the corollary, viz: a one-party state. Speaking of H-itchens, and his
hilarious and scathing attack of the Clinton administration; this may be the proper place to
note that my puckish plea to throw a little partisan class warfare back into the public debate,
on sports stadia and much more, should not be read as a wholesale endorsement of the demo-
cratic party as presently constituted. Conversely, it is a good place to note that some of the
most colorful, powerful, and corrupt urban patronage machines of yesteryear were republican.
37. See sources cited supra note 17, as well as the excellent articles included in this
Symposium.
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cards, when the sports barons and their media priests speak? Why are
elected democrats, tribunes of the toiling masses, and guardians of the
poor, and elected Republicans, crusaders for the forgotten middle class
willingly participating in this massive transfer of public wealth into pri-
vate, super rich hands? Is it just greed, or corruption, or stupidity, or
timidity?
I suggest something else is at work too. I suggest we are losing the
capacity to imagine the positive, independent exercise of intrinsic polit-
ical power. By use of the word intrinsic, I am trying to reach an under-
standing of political power, which a real philosopher might call self-
referential. The idea here is of a cluster of uniquely political questions,
concepts, principles, and so on-a political space, or realm, or sphere. A
political side of life; a political aspect of things, which can certainly min-
gle with the economic aspect of things, as well as with the cultural, aes-
thetic, social, historic, technical, psychic, moral, spiritual, aspects of
things, but which, at the end of the day, cannot be exhaustively ex-
plained by nor essentially reduced to a function of anything else. So, just
as we would seek to answer a question of aesthetics with reference to an
idea, or rule, or norm of beauty, largely, or even completely ignoring
considerations of cost or efficiency, we would seek to answer questions
of politics by reference to some idea of justice, equity, fairness, the pub-
lic good. Justice that may or may not be compatible with quarterly earn-
ing statements, justice that does not stand or fall upon a wealth-creation
calculus, but upon the power of the sword, viz: the coercive power of the
state to compel obedience to a governmentally mediated vision of the
common weal.
These ideas are not new.38 And it is easy to get carried away and
start building intricate systems of harmoniously interlocking spheres, ex-
plaining everything in a perfect world. That is not my intent here. I
offer it simply by way of preface to a very down-to-earth, twentieth-cen-
tury manifestation of this phenomenon-the death of the urban pa-
tronage machine. Which brings us back again to the question, why local
elected officials do not stand and fight more often? The answer is that
there is no longer any place left for them to stand.
Imagine you are back in the late 1940s or early 1950s. You are a fly
on the wall and you are watching legendary patriarch of the Pittsburgh
Steelers, Art Rooney walking into the office of Pittsburgh's legendary
38. Indeed, they are a fairly patent rip-off of Plato, Aquinas, a few Dutchmen, and a half
dozen others, tempered by common sense and fifteen years in the kitchen with Tom Flaherty.
A different writer could have arrived at the same ideas from any number of other routes.
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Mayor Davey Lawrence, may they both, great men, rest in peace. After
a few minutes of light-hearted banter Art drops the bomb. He demands
a new stadium, paid for primarily by the taxpayers of Steeltown, and if
he does not get it exactly the way he wants it, he is taking the Steelers to
San Diego. What would his Honor do? Now, maybe I have got this all-
wrong. Maybe Lawrence would have caved. Maybe Rooney has the
blessing of the Mellon interests. Maybe Pitt is lining up for its next great
land grab and all the bets are in. Maybe Rooney knows Republican
prosecutors who are planning to indict Lawrence, again, maybe, maybe,
maybe. But, in my mind, I see it another way. I see Lawrence picking
up the phone, still calm, still with that big smile and maybe getting
through to Harry Truman. A decade later, as Governor, he would have
gotten through to Jack Kennedy who owed him big time for bringing the
Pennsylvania delegation his way at the 1960 convention. He calls in a
few chips and hangs up. Without flinching he laughingly tells Art he can
go to Hell. He is not leaving Pittsburgh alive. He raps his big ring on
the desktop and the meeting is over.
Wacky? Far fetched? Maybe so, but that is not the point. The point
is that it is virtually impossible to imagine such a thing happening today.
We almost do not have a category for it anymore. Nobody, to cop a very
over-used phrase, would "get it." That world is lost to us now; a strange
world of raw political power, and the men who knew how to get it, how
to keep it, and how to wield it. At times, perhaps by accident, perhaps
by design, they even managed to wield it in the direction of something
once called the public good. A world in which those who chose to stand
and fight, could find a place to stand. That place being a sensible middle
ground and a buffer between private, unregulated greed and the chaos of
the huddled masses. How alien it all seems to us now! The triumph of
the reformers in that war of words, the propaganda war I mentioned
above, was total and unconditional, and the histories of the various cam-
paigns and battles have all been written by the winners. Courageous
newspaper editors, crusading voters leagues, progressive civil service
laws, the rising sun of public sector unionism, a properly educated elec-
torate, and various other champions of good government all combined
to vanquish the evils of job patronage and machine politics and lead
America into the verdant pastures of civic responsibility.39
39. I also think that perhaps the biggest factor of all in the death of the urban patronage
machine was the rise of another machine, the automobile. People left the old, inner-city, river
wards by the millions. New federally subsidized highways destroyed thousands of acres of old
city neighborhoods and turned much of what was left into crumbling patches of urban land-
scape that the new commuters drove through or around or over. Out in Suburbia the children
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But something happened on the way to the pasture. The death of the
machine meant the unchallenged rise of big money and big media. Col-
orful crooks were replaced by colorless lackeys. Politicians, who sat
down at the table with the corporate elite as equals, because they had
the votes, were replaced by managers and professionals who waited out
in the hall for any scraps or crumbs that might be left. Party discipline
crumbled and mavericks and media darlings arose who could go straight
to the people, assuming, of course, they could buy the airtime. Cam-
paigns got very boring. From the halcyon days of knife fights and ballot
box stuffing, they descended into debates on the issues, the biggest issue,
of course, alWays being economic development about which there was
never any debate. Less people voted. Election season just didn't have
that old zip any more. Now, apparently, the only person who could tell
the difference between the indistinguishable candidates, was the better
educated, i.e., newspaper-reading, more affluent, independent voter.
Growth and those who brought it were always good. Politics and those
who practiced it were always bad.4"
Now, it would be an even greater mistake to romanticize the urban
patronage machine of yesteryear. The big chiefs at the Tammany Wig-
wam were not giving away Bibles. Neither was Davey Lawrence. The
machine was not about "justice." It was about the pre-condition of jus-
tice - power. Th'e machine rewarded friends and punished enemies. It
divided the spoils of war through rampant, unabashed job patronage.
This was the necessary corollary to its power. The slayers of the machine
understood this and focused their attacks accordingly. They won. I have
no interest in re-kindling a war that was lost fifty, perhaps one hundred
years ago.
Yet, I have a nagging suspicion. I think we might wake up someday
and discover there are certain things, integral to the maintenance of soci-
ety as a going concern, which only the urban patronage machine, or
something like it, can do. Not the scientists, not the technocrats, not the
Elmer "good-government" Gantry's of the world, nor the neo-robber
and grandchildren of the democratic ward heelers could now begin to think like republicans,
thanks, in no small part, to the very success and power of the job patronage machine, the
darker side of which they now strive to forget.
40. This may be starting to sound very conspiratorial and preachy. That is not my intent.
Rather, I am consciously painting the story with these stark and rather epic strokes to shock
and amuse, in the hope that it might lead to different ways of understanding much of what has
happened in the last one hundred years. The reigning paradigm, which might be dubbed,
"triumphalist-reformist," is so strong, we may only be able to see past it, or around it, for the
next few decades by laughing at it.
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barons of the "right" or the utopian schemers of the "left," not the bor-
ing prophets of economic development; and not even the stadium build-
ers with their modem variant of "bread and circus." But, that is only
someday. For now, the whole thing is going to have to play itself out.
As I said in the Introduction, in the absence of authentic legislative
change at the federal level (unlikely) or seismic shifts in the role of
sports in American culture (unimaginable in the short term), many more
cities will soon have their own stories to tell. To those of you in those
cities, this article offers the results of our research. As Davey Lawrence





















$209,000,000 (site clearance and off-site infrastructure borne by
public)
$40,000,000 paid as follows:
Cash Upfront: $8,500,000
Annual Payments: $2,900,000 for 29.5 years {financed by 5% ticket
surcharge and naming rights agreement with PNC}
$169,000,000 paid from a variety of sources including RAD
Countywide 1% Sales Tax; 7% County Hotel/Motel Tax; $70,000,000
from State
Team 100% (No Credit Against Rent)
5% Amusement Tax on gate; 31% Parking Tax; 1% Player Payroll
Tax; 2 mills Mercantile Tax on retail sales; 6 mill Business Privilege
Tax on Pirates, contractors, services, etc.
$100,000 per year base rent; plus 5-10% of excess gate (see below);
plus 5% of excess concessions (see below); plus 15% of selected non-
MLB "net revenues"
29.5 years
Team gets 100% (net of 5% Amusement Tax and 5% ticket
surcharge) up to $44,500,000; 95% up to $52,500,000; 90% thereafter
Team gets 100% up to certain caps (42% "aggregate gross concession
revenue" ie., after paying concessionaire; and/or $9.00 per capita
adjusted yearly by CPI) for all games and Team-sponsored non-MLB
events; Public gets concessions at up to 10 Local or State sponsored
non-MLB events per year
Team gets 100% In-Stadium; 100% of outside marquee
Team gets 100% of $30,000,000 over 20 years
Team gets 100% of luxury suites, club seats, and PSLs
At Team-sponsored non-MLB events Team gets 85% of gate (net of
5% amusement Tax and 5% ticket surcharge), public gets 15%, Team
gets 100% of concessions, advertising, broadcasting, merchandising,
rentals, additional revenues from playoff games, etc. Public to get
100% of 5% ticket surcharge but this will probably go to Capital
Reserve Fund; At Public-sponsored non-MLB events (five per year
reserved for Authority and five for State) public gets net revenues
from gate and concessions
Team pays 100% routine maintenance, utility costs, insurance
Capital Reserve Fund started with $3,000,000 from public bonds,
augmented by 5% ticket surcharge proceeds to the extent they
exceed $1,500,000 in any year, up to $375,000 (adjusted yearly by
CPI); public pays for any other repairs or improvements that exceed
amounts in Capital Reserve Fund
Still in negotiations; Team wants net full year revenues from parcel
on Federal & Canal; net game day revenues from new parking garage
and various surrounding lots
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CAPACITY: 44,321 LEASE DATE: 629/88
$150,000,000
$1.00 per year, plus 35% of sum of local, but not national, broadcast
revenues and signage, after first $10,000,000; plus "ticket fee" ranging
from $1.50 to $4.00 per ticket subject to various break points and off-
setting credits, most likely used for public's obligation to pay for
major repairs
20 years, with four successive 5-year extension options






Public gets net gate receipts, net concessions, and net parking
revenues
Team's responsibility, although public pays "maintenance subsidy" to
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CAPACITY: 40,625 LEASE DATE: 1119190
1973 construction costs of approx. $70,000,000; in 1990 parties agreed
on renovations not to exceed $6,500,000
$450,000 per year, plus 5% of "gross receipts" (essentially gate,
parking, concessions and rentals less applicable taxes and all
expenses; gross receipts does not include broadcast revenues)
between $7,500,000 and $12,500,000; 4% of gross receipts between
$12,500,000 and $17,500,000; and 2% of gross receipts in excess of
$17,500,000
25 years
Team gets remainder after various percentages of gross receipts paid
to public (see rent provisions above); parties agree not to impose






Team gets 100% concessions, parking, and gate for concerts, other
sporting events, etc.; for "civic and community" events Team gets
100% parking and concessions, but no gate
Public's responsibility including utilities
Public's responsibility
Team gets 100%
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CAPACITY: 43,345 LEASE DATE: 7/3/91
$176,000,000
$0.75 per ticket sold after the first 1,850,000 up to 2,250,000; plus
$1.00 per each ticket sold between 2,250,000 and 2,500,000; plus $1.25
per each ticket sold above 2,500,000
20 years
See Rent, above; team keeps remainder
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100%
Public has right to sell and retain proceeds for uses consistent with
lease and management agreement
Team gets 100%
Not addressed in lease; few non-MLB events each year;, revenues
shared with public on case-by-case basis
Public's responsibility
Public's responsibility
Team gets 100% net revenues from on-site parking; 50% net
revenues from "common areas" lots; 25% of net revenues from
"additional parking" (7-10,000 spaces within a 2,000 foot radius)
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Capacity: 49,178 LEASE DATE: 6/23/92
$191,000,000
Base rent of $2,000,000 per year; plus $1,500,000 per year until bonds
are paid off; plus a $1.00 per ticket surcharge, up to $2,000,000 per
year, which is also paid by team until bonds are paid off
30 years




Team gets 95% of luxury suite rentals until 1999, then 100%
thereafter
Team gets 100%
Team's responsibility but only to extent it is not covered by annual
deposits of not to exceed $2,000,000 from ticket surcharge, but only if
such ticket surcharge proceeds are not needed in any given year to
amortize construction bonds
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ORIOLE PARK AT CAMDEN YARDS, BALTIMORE ORIOLES
BuIL= 1992 CAPACITY: 48,262 LEASE DATE: 9/2/92
Cosr: $210,000,000
RENT. 7% of "net admission receipts" (Le., gate, net of 10% admissions tax
to Maryland Stadium Authority; and payments to American League
and visiting teams); plus 10% of "net private suite revenues;" plus
7.5% of revenues from club level license or membership fees; 1.7%
to 7.5% of "gross concession revenues;" 25% of "net Ballpark
advertising revenues;"
TEAM: 30 years, with one 5-year extension option
GATE: Team gets gate after 7% rent (see above) and 10% admissions tax
CONCESSIONS: Public gets between 1.7% and 7.5% of "gross concession revenues"
ADVERTISING: Public gets 25% of "net Ballpark advertising revenues"
NAMING Rorrs: N/A
ENHANCED SEATING: Public gets 10% of "net private suite revenues;" 7.5% of revenues
from club level license or membership fees
NoN-GAME EvEr'rs: Subject to same revenue sharing agreements as MLB events, per this
Table
MAINTENANCE: Public's responsibility except for playing field conditions during
baseball season and other limited "year round" team areas
CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS: Public's responsibility
PARKING: Public operates and maintains, but team receives a portion of parking
receipts attributable to baseball games ("net parking income"). 50%
of this team share is included in the calculation of "net admission
receipts" for purposes of calculating team's rent
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CAPACITY: 49,831 LEASE DATE: 3/16193
$235,000,000
$500,000 base operator's fee; plus any naming rights monies in excess
of $1,500,000 up to a maximum of $250,000 per year




Team gets first $1,500,000 each year; plus any amount above the
additional $250,000 paid as yearly rent (see above)
Team gets 100%
In absence of event-specific agreement to the contrary, public and
team share 50-50 the "net ticket revenues" for all non-MLB events
including community events, concerts, etc.; team keeps all other
revenues: concessions, advertising, etc.
Team's responsibility
Public's responsibility, but partially funded by capital fee of
$1,000,000 to $1,500,000 paid yearly by team
Team gets 91.75% of gross parking revenues, out of which comes
operating costs; team pays community fee of 8.25% gross parking
receipts, less any applicable taxes, to the City of Atlanta and Fulton
County Recreation Authority or to its designee, "for the purposes of
benefiting neighborhoods in which the Baseball Complex is situated
or which are otherwise affected by the Olympic Stadium" (This was
intended to be based on approximately 8,900 spaces)
20001
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CAPACITY: 48,569 MEMO. OF UNDERSTANDING: 2/17/94
$354,000,000
$1,000,000 base rent per year, plus $0.50 for every ticket sold after
the first 2,000,000 ($1.00 between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000, and $1.50
after 3,000,000); plus 5% of the premium portion of gross club seat
and luxury suite revenues; plus $325,000 per year from naming rights;
plus certain parking and concessions splits for non-MLB events
10 years with six 5-year extension options
Team gets 100% less 6.8% county sales tax per ticket ($238,000,000
of the costs to be financed through sales tax revenues)
Public owner of stadium (Maricopa County Stadium District) also
owns the concessionaire and handles it in-house
Team gets 100%
Team gets $1,000,000 per year with 5% escalator (on $66,000,000 deal
over 30 years with Bank One) but must give $325,000 per year to
public
Team gets 95% and public gets 5% of gross club seat and luxury
suite revenues
Public controls booking of non-MLB events; at such events public
and team split parking 50-50; and public (concessionaire) and team
split concessions 50-50
Team pays 100%; public reimburses team for any maintenance
expenses attributable to non-MLB events
Shared responsibility; initially the interest from construction bond
funds is used to fund a long-term project reserve account up to
$1,000,000, otherwise team makes annual payments of $250,000 into a
project reserve account; any capital improvements costing more than
amounts in these reserve accounts are neither the team's nor the
public's responsibility under the lease and must be agreed upon on a
case by case basis
Team gets 100% except for 50-50 split on public-sponsored, non-MLB
events
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CAPACITY: 50,200 LEASE DATE: 3/30/95
$215,000,000
$0.25 per "Major League Baseball Game Attendee," after the first
2,250,000 fans and up to 2,500,000; $0.50 per fan up to 3,000,000; and
$1.00 per fan over 3,000,000, all this to result in guaranteed minimum
yearly payment of $100,000; under certain unlikely scenarios team
may pay additional amount (capped at $150,000 per year) in money
or in services
22 years with three successive 5-year extension options
Team gets 100% for MLB events, less ticket charges in rent, above
Team generally receives 100% for MLB events; public gets 3-5% of




Public gets 40% of "net profit" for non-MLB events sponsored by
team; and 50% for non-MLB events sponsored by public; "net profit"
is defined as "gross receipts from all sources less operating costs"
Team's responsibility
Team's responsibility under most circumstances
For MLB events and non-MLB events sponsored by team, team gets
80% and public gets 20% of "parking net profits;" for non-MLB
events sponsored by public, team gets 20% and public gets 80%
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REPuRIS~HED: 1997 CAPACITY: 46,000
4/28195
Original cost: $147,000,000; cost of renovations: $65,000,000
$0.50 for every ticket sold up to and including 3,300,000; $0.75 for
every ticket above 3,300,000; the first $250,000 each year deposited
into capital account, the next $100,000 paid to City of St. Petersburg
as rent, and all amounts over $350,000 paid to City
30 years
Team gets 100% after ticket charge (see Rent, above)
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100%
Each year Team gets first $800,000, the next $250,000 is paid into the
capital account, the next $500,000 is split 50-50 between team and
City, and amounts over $1,550,000 are split 85% to team, 15% to the
city
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100% for non-MLB, team-sponsored events; team commits
to allow at least 12 "civic" events each year for which it gets 100% of
parking and concessions, but no share of gate (if any); also team
agrees to stage one charitable event per year at the stadium and
donate the proceeds to charity
Team's responsibility; team receives $4,200,000 as an upfront
management fee, payable within the first two years of the lease (but
see "additional deposits" to capital account, below)
Team's responsibility through yearly deposits of $250,000, from ticket
stub funds, into capital account plus additional deposits up to
$4,200,000, as needed, into capital account; also a possible $250,000
from naming rights goes into this fund, but only after Team takes
first $800,000; team's responsibility not total in cases of acts of God,
etc.
Team gets 100%
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REFURBISHED: 1996 CAPAcrrY: 47,313
10/31/95
$25,500,000 in 1966; 1996 renovations approximately $200,000,000
$250,000 base rent; plus $0.25 ticket surcharge (dedicated to
improvements); plus 50% of concessions (but public loans $2,500,000
of this back to team); plus $100 for each club seat sold, 10% of club
seat "net revenues," and 50% of net revenues from stadium boxes
after the first $750,000
10 years with one 3-year option to extend
Team got 100% through 1996 season; beginning with 1997 season
team pays $0.25 ticket surcharge; this may increase beginning with
the 2000 season; all surcharge collections to be used to fund stadium
improvements
Team and public split 50-50; public commits to make loan of
$2,500,000 to team from its share of concessions, term of said loan to
coincide with term of lease; team only has to pay this back using
"excess gate receipts" should they occur in subsequent years
Team gets 100% except for $10,000 yearly fee to public for use of
"Diamond Vision" equipment
Public gets 90%, team gets 10% if such a sale is made
Public gets $100 for each club seat membership sold and 10% of club
seat "net revenues;" public gets 50% of net revenues from stadium
boxes after the first $750,000
Team may only schedule "baseball related events;" public retains the
right to schedule concerts, group meetings, other athletic events,
etcetera, and receive any revenues attributable thereto
Responsibility shared by team and public
Public's responsibility; may use ticket surcharge funds
Team pays $100,000 per year for exclusive parking rights over "Lot
M;" team and public use "split operations plan" whereby team
operates parking areas and retains net revenues for all games and
baseball-related events, and public does same for all other events
2000]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL













1996/97 CAPACITY: 64,593 LEASE DATE: 5115196
Lease estimate of $100,000,000 for renovations
Base rent payment made every six months over the term of the lease
(33 years) calculated to amortize the costs (up to $80,000,000) initially
incurred by the City of Anaheim, CA, attributable to the renovations,
said payments to carry an interest rate of 7.5%; in addition the Team
pays $2.00 ticket surcharge on every paid admission after the first
2,600,000 fans each year; plus 20% of "gross revenues" from sale of
PSLs; plus additional revenue sharing for other events, and parking
under certain conditions
33 years with three 3-year extension options; Team has escape clause
option after 20 years




Public gets 20% of "gross revenues" from sale of preferred seat
licenses; Team gets 100% of suites, club seats, and premium seats
If Team's revenues from other events (concerts, other athletic events,
etc.) exceeds $2,000,000 (adjusted yearly by CPI), the Public gets
25% of such excess; Public may also schedule up to 10 other events
but only in parking areas; otherwise, Team retains all revenues from
non-MLB events
Team responsibility
Public's responsibility primarily; Team may make yearly contributions
to capital reserve fund but these appear to be largely offset by
Public's contributions
If Team's "operating net income" from parking exceeds $4,000,000 in
any year (adjusted yearly by CPI), the Public gets 25% of such
excess; otherwise Team operates and receives revenues from all
parking
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CAPACTY: 46,621 LEASE DATE: 12/23196
$498,000,000
Base rent of $700,000 per year adjusted annually by CPI; plus a
"profit sharing" plan under which Public receives 10% "net income"
less "cumulative net loss" pursuant to a very detailed formula
22 years with three 5-year extension options
Team gets 100% net of 5% admissions tax, and 5% surcharge on





Team gets 100% for all non-MLB events (except for limited number
of events scheduled by Public with revenue shared on case-by-case
basis)
Team's responsibility
Team's responsibility partially funded by 5% gross ticket revenues
surcharge, and partially by Public through excess revenues from
admissions tax (if any arise after mandated bond payments)
Public agrees to provide parking garage (minimum 1,525 spaces) and
surface lot (165 spaces); Team operates and retains all parking
revenues subject to possible obligation to use parking revenues to
make parking bond payments (for costs of construction), but only if
5% admissions tax proceeds prove inadequate for this
2000]
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10/96 OPENING: 2001 CAPACITY: 43,000
12/31/96
$322,000,000
Base rent to equal 10% of the public's annual bond debt service, less
any taxes paid by licensees of skyboxes; lease schedule calculates this
to be $900,000 in each of the first ten years, and $1,200,000 in each of
the second ten years






Team schedules all non-MLB events, subject to public's approval, and
retains non-game event revenues
Team's responsibility but, the public makes yearly contribution to the
team of the lesser of 64% of "annual actual maintenance costs" or
$3,850,000, and the team is allowed to include its base rent and its
$300,000 annual contribution for capital improvements in "annual
actual maintenance costs;" net result of all this could be total public
responsibility for maintenance in many of the years during the term
of the lease
Public puts $700,000 per year and team puts $300,000 per year into
"segregated reserve fund" for capital improvements; beyond this the
public is responsible for all major repairs and improvements
Lease is silent on specific parking provisions but it seems that team
would retain all revenues from any lots or garages on the Ballpark
site
[Vol. 10:237
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ENRON FIELD, HOUSTON ASTROS
CONSTRUCTION BEGAN: 11/97 OPENING: 3/2000 CAPAcrrY: 42,000
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT DATE: 11/5/97
COs-r. "Guaranteed Maximum Price" (subject to "necessary" change orders,
etc.) $230,000,000
RENT. $4,600,000 per year ($3,400,000 base rent plus $1,200,000 royalty
under licensing agreement) may be paid from future dedicated
revenue streams (example, naming rights) yet to be specified; also
possible credits against future admissions taxes or parking taxes
TERM: 30 years with two 5-year extension options
GATE: Team gets 100% (less possible future admissions taxes; however,
these could be credited against Team's rent)
CONCESSIONS: Team gets 100%]
ADVERTnsiNG: Team gets 100%
NAmIG RIGHTS: Team gets 100%
ENHANCED SEATING: Team gets 100%
NON-GAMs EvEmS: Yet to be specified
MAINTENANCE: Team's responsibility
CAPrrAL IMPRovEMENTS: Team's responsibility; Team makes annual contribution of $2,500,000
into "capital fund" for this (but these payments could, like rent, be
off-set by future admission tax and parking tax revenues)
PARKING: Team gets 100%
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OPENING: 4/2000 CAPACITY- 42,000 LEASE DATE: 8/20/98
$260,000,000
Tligers are calling this a "sub-lease" from the Detroit Downtown
Development Authority (DDA); in reality the Team is more of a
joint owner since they will contribute $145,000,000 to the costs of
construction; Team gives 50,000 tickets away each year to low-income
kids; Team "tifs" certain "ad valorum" taxes attributable to its use of
the stadium into a maintenance fund, and will also contribute (after
six years) $300,000 per year into capital improvements
35 years with six 10-year extension options
Team gets 100% except for Public sponsored non-M.B events





For Team sponsored MLB and non-MLB events, Team gets 100% of
everything; for Public sponsored "civic, charitable, or cultural" events,
Public gets all broadcast fees (if any), net revenues from gate, and a
percentage of parking and concessions agreed upon with the Team on
a case-by-case basis
Team's responsibility, however this may be largely off-set by annual
contributions of ad valorum taxes attributable to Team's use of
stadium that are tiffed into an "operational and maintenance fund;"
the DDA must approve disbursements from this fund
Shared responsibility; Public makes $250,000 yearly contribution into
"major repair and replacement fund;" Team (after first six years)
makes $300,000 yearly contribution into same fund; if capital
improvements exceed amounts in this fund both parties must agree
on a way to pay for them
Team gets 100%; but Team pays $20,000,000 to public in partial
consideration for right to operate and manage parking in the complex
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TAMPA BAY DEVIL RAYS:
OAKLAND ATm.Ecs:
$100,000 per year base rent; plus 5-10% of excess gate; plus 5% of
excess concessions; plus 15% of selected non-MLB "net revenues"
$1.00 per year, plus 35% of sum of local (but not national)
broadcast revenues and signage, after first $10,000,000; plus "ticket
fee" ranging from $1.50 to $4.00 per ticket subject to various break
points and off-setting credits (most likely used for public's
obligation to pay for major repairs)
$450,000 per year; plus 5% of "gross receipts" (essentially gate,
parking, concessions and rentals less applicable taxes and all
expenses; gross receipts does not include broadcast revenues)
between $7,500,000 and $12,500,000; 4% of gross receipts between
$12,500,000 and $17,500,000; and 2% of gross receipts in excess of
$17,500,000
$0.75 per ticket sold after the first 1,850,000 up to 2,250,000; plus
$1.00 per each ticket sold between 2,250,000 and 2,500,000; plus
$1.25 per each ticket sold above 2,500,000
Base rent of $2,000,000 per year; plus $1,500,000 per year until
bonds are paid off; plus a $1.00 per ticket surcharge (up to
$2,000,000 per year), which is also paid by Team until bonds are
paid off
7% of "net admission receipts" (ie., gate, net of 10% admissions
tax to Maryland Stadium Authority; and payments to American
League and visiting teams); plus 10% of "net private suite
revenues;" plus 7.5% of revenues from club level license or
membership fees; 1.7% to 7.5% of "gross concession revenues;"
25% of "net Ballpark advertising revenues;"
$500,000 base "operator's fee;" plus any naming rights monies in
excess of $1,500,000 up to a maximum of $250,000 per year
$1,000,000 base rent per year; plus $0.50 for every ticket sold after
the first 2,000,000 ($1.00 between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000, and $1.50
after 3,000,000; plus 5% of the premium portion of gross club seat
and luxury suite revenues; plus $325,000 per year from naming
rights; plus certain parking and concessions splits for non-MLB
events
$0.25 per "Major League Baseball Game Attendee", after the first
2,250,000 fans and up to 2,500,000; $0.50 per fan up to 3,000,000;
and $1.00 per fan over 3,000,000, all this to result in guaranteed
minimum yearly payment of $100,000; under certain unlikely
scenarios team may pay additional amount (capped at $150,000 per
year) in money or in services
$0.50 for every ticket sold up to and including 3,300,000; $0.75 for
every ticket above 3,300,000; the first $250,000 each year deposited
into capital account, the next $100,000 paid to City of St. Petersburg
as rent, and all amounts over $350,000 paid to City
$250,000 base rent; plus $0.25 ticket surcharge (dedicated to
improvements); plus 50% of concessions (but Public loans
$2,500,000 of this back to Team); plus $100 for each club seat sold,
10% of club seat "net revenues," and 50% of net revenues from
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Base rent is a payment made every six months over the term of the
lease (33 years) calculated to amortize the costs (up to $80,000,000)
initially incurred by the City of Anaheim, CA, attributable to the
renovations, said payments to carry an interest rate of 7.5%; in
addition the Team pays $2.00 ticket surcharge on every paid
admission after the first 2,600,000 fans each year;, plus 20% of
"gross revenues" from sale of PSIs; plus additional revenue sharing
for other events, and parking under certain conditions
Base rent of $700,000 per year adjusted annually by CPI; plus a
"profit sharing" plan under which Public receives 10% "net
income" less "cumulative net loss" pursuant to a very detailed
formula
Base rent to equal 10% of the Public's annual bond debt service
(less any taxes paid by licensees of skyboxes); lease schedule
calculates this to be $900,000 in each of the first ten years, and
$1,200,000 in each of the second ten years
$4,600,000 per year ($3,400,000 base rent plus $1,200,000 royalty
under licensing agreement) may be paid from future dedicated
revenue streams (ex., naming rights) yet to be specified; also
possible credits against rent from future admissions taxes or parking
taxes
Tigers are calling this a "sub-lease" from the Detroit Downtown
Development Authority (DDA); in reality the Team is more of ajoint owner since they will contribute $145,000,000 to the costs of
construction; Team gives 50,000 tickets away each year to low-
income kids; Team "tifs" certain "ad valorum" taxes attributable to
its use of the stadium into a maintenance fund, and will also
contribute (after six years) $300,000 per year into capital
improvements


















At Team-sponsored non-MLB events Team gets 85% of gate (net of
5% Amusement Tax and 5% ticket surcharge), public gets 15%,
Team gets 100% of concessions, advertising, broadcasting,
merchandising, rentals, additional revenues from playoff games, etc.
Public to get 100% of 5% ticket surcharge but this will probably go
to Capital Reserve Fund; At Public-sponsored non-MLB events
(five per year reserved for Authority and five for State) Public gets
net revenues from gate and concessions
Public gets net gate receipts, net concessions, and net parking
revenues
Team gets 100% concessions, parking, and gate for concerts, other
sporting events, etc.; for "civic and community" events Team gets
100% parking and concessions, but no gate
Not addressed in lease; few non-MLB events each year;, revenues
shared with Public on case-by-case basis
Team gets 100%
Subject to same revenue sharing agreements as MLB events, i.e.,
7% of "net admission receipts" (i.e., gate, net of 10% admissions
tax to Maryland Stadium Authority; and payments to American
League and visiting teams); plus 10% of "net private suite
revenues;" plus 7.5% of revenues from club level license or
membership fees; 1.7% to 7.5% of "gross concession revenues;"
25% of "net Ballpark advertising revenues"
In absence of event-specific agreement to the contrary, Public and
Team share 50-50 the "net ticket revenues" for all non-MLB events
including community events, concerts, etc.; Team keeps all other
revenues: concessions, advertising, etc.
Public controls booking of non-MLB events; at such events Public
and Team split parking 50-50; and Public (concessionaire) and Team
split concessions 50-50
Public gets 40% of "net profit" for non-MLB events sponsored by
Team; and 50% for non-MLB events sponsored by Public; "net
profit" is defined as "gross receipts from all sources less operating
costs"
Team gets 100% for non-MLB, Team-sponsored events; Team
commits to allow at least 12 "civic" events each year for which it
gets 100% of parking and concessions, but no share of gate (if any);
also Team agrees to stage one charitable event per year at the
stadium and donate the proceeds to charity
Team may only schedule "baseball related events;" Public retains
the right to schedule concerts, group meetings, other athletic events,
etc., and receive any revenues attributable thereto
If Team's revenues from other events (concerts, other athletic
events, etc.) exceeds $2,000,000 (adjusted yearly by CPI), the Public
gets 25% of such excess; Public may also schedule up to 10 other
events but only in parking areas; otherwise, Team retains all
revenues from non-MLB event
Team gets 100% for all non-MLB events (except for limited
number of events scheduled by Public with revenue shared on case-
by-case basis)
Team schedules all non-MLB events (subject to Public's approval)
and retains all revenues therefrom
Yet to be specified
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DL-rRorr TImERs: For Team sponsored MLB and non-MLB events, Team gets 100%
of everything; for Public sponsored "civic, charitable, or cultural"
events, Public gets all broadcast fees (if any), net revenues from
gate, and a percentage of parking and concessions agreed upon with
the Team on a case-by-case basis
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Still in negotiations; Team wants net full year revenues from parcel
on Federal & Canal; net game day revenues from new parking
garage and various surrounding lots
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100% net revenues from on-site parking; 50% net
revenues from "common areas" lots; 25% of net revenues from
"additional parking" (7-10,000 spaces within a 2,000 foot radius)
Team gets 100%
Public operates and maintains, but Team receives a portion of
parking receipts attributable to baseball games ("net parking
income") and 50% of this Team share is included in the calculation
of "net admission receipts" for purposes of calculating Team's rent
Team gets 91.75% of gross parking revenues (out of which comes
operating costs); Team pays "community fee" of 8.25% "gross
parking receipts" (less any applicable taxes) to the City of Atlanta
and Fulton County Recreation Authority or to its designee, "for the
purposes of benefiting the neighborhoods in which the Baseball
Complex is situated or which are otherwise affected by the Olympic
Stadium" (This was intended to be based on approximately 8,900
spaces)
Team gets 100% except for 50-50 split on Public-sponsored, non-
MLB events
For MLB events and non-MLB events sponsored by Team, Team
gets 80% and Public gets 20% of "parking net profits;" for non-
MLB events sponsored by Public, Team gets 20% and Public gets
80%
Team gets 100%
Team pays $100,000 per year for exclusive parking rights over "Lot
M;" Team and Public use "split operations plan" whereby Team
operates parking areas and retains net revenues for all games and
baseball-related events, and Public does same for all other events
If Team's "operating net income" from parking exceeds $4,000,000
in any year (adjusted yearly by CPI), the Public gets 25% of such
excess; otherwise Team operates and receives revenues from all
parking
Public agrees to provide parking garage (minimum 1,525 spaces)
and surface lot (165 spaces); Team operates and retains all revenues
therefrom subject to possible obligation to use parking revenues to
make parking bond payments (for costs of construction), but only if
5% admissions tax proceeds prove inadequate for this
Lease is silent on specific parking provisions but it seems that Team
would retain all revenues from any lots or garages on the Ballpark
site
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100%; but Team pays $20,000,000 to public in partial
consideration for right to operate and manage parking in the
complex
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Capital Reserve Fund started with $3,000,000 from public bonds,
augmented by 5% ticket surcharge proceeds to the extent they
exceed $1,500,000 in any year, up to $375,000 (adjusted yearly by
CPI); public pays for any other repairs or improvements that




Unclear from language; not specifically addressed; probably Public's
responsibility
Public's responsibility
Public's responsibility, but partially funded by "capital fee" of
$1,000,000 to $1,500,000 paid yearly by Team
Shared responsibility; initially the interest from construction bond
funds is used to fund a "long term project reserve" account up to
$1,000,000, otherwise Team makes annual payments of $250,000 into
a "project reserve account;" any capital improvements costing more
than amounts in these reserve accounts are neither the Team's nor
the Public's responsibility under the lease and must be agreed upon
on a case by case basis
Team's responsibility under most circumstances
Team's responsibility through yearly deposits of $250,000 (from
ticket stub funds) into capital account plus additional deposits up to
$4,200,000 (as needed) into capital account; also a possible $250,000
per year from naming rights goes into this fund, but only after
Team takes first $800,000; Team's responsibility not total in cases of
acts of God, etc.
Public's responsibility; may use ticket surcharge funds
Public's responsibility primarily; team may make yearly
contributions to capital reserve fund but these appear to be largely
offset by Public's contributions
Team's responsibility partially funded by 5% gross ticket revenues
surcharge, and partially by Public through excess revenues from
admissions tax (if any arise after mandated bond payments)
Public puts $700,000 per year and Team puts $300,000 per year into
"segregated reserve fund" for capital improvements; beyond this the
Public is responsible for all major repairs and improvements
Team's responsibility; Team makes annual contribution of $2,500,000
into "capital fund" for this (but these payments could, like rent, be
off-set by future admission tax and parking tax revenues)
Shared responsibility; Public makes $250,000 yearly contribution
into "major repair and replacement fund;" Team (after first six
years) makes $300,000 yearly contribution into same fund; if capital
improvements exceed amounts in this fund both parties must agree
on a way to pay for them
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CAPACrrY: 65,000 approx. MEMO. OF INTENT DATE: 10/28/98
$233,000,000 estimate
Team's responsibility; if, however, the Team successfully markets at
least $17,000,000 in club seats (part of the Team's contribution to
stadium construction costs), Team gets a credit against rent for any
cost overruns it covers
Base rent of $250,000 per year TERM: 29.5 years
Team gets 100% less 5% Amusement Tax and 5% ticket surcharge
(Note: Team uses first $1,400,000 from ticket surcharge proceeds each
year to amortize its contribution to construction costs)
Team gets 100% at all home games and other Team-sponsored
sporting events; 85% for Team-sponsored non-sporting events (see
Non-game events below, for more details)
Team gets 100% of all in-stadium advertising
Team gets 100%
Team has option to sell and retain 100% of all revenues
Team gets 100%; approx. $37,000,000 in PSL revenue used for Team's
contribution to stadium construction costs; amounts in excess of
$37,000,000 are to be used to offset any shortfalls in the Public's
contribution towards stadium construction; also $17,000,000 in club
seat revenues (and/or rent payments) used for Team's contribution to
construction costs
At Team-sponsored non-sporting events (concerts, mass meetings,
etc.) Team gets 85% and Public gets 15% of "event specific net
revenues;" this probably includes, at minimum, gate, concessions, and
parking; unclear if it covers advertising of broadcasting; almost
certainly does not cover premium portions of enhanced seating; in
addition, five dates per year reserved for "public events;" any
revenue sharing arrangements with respect to these are not yet
finalized
Team's responsibility
Shared; Public contributes $3,000,000 from initial Plan B bond issue;
Team contributes all ticket surcharge proceeds in excess of
$1,400,000; (Team may also contribute visiting teams' share of club
seat revenues, but only after the 16th year) any capital improvements
exceeding amounts in capital reserve fund will be the responsibility of
the Public
Still in negotiations; the intent is to give the Team "game-day net
revenues" from approx. 5,000 nearby parking spaces in new or
existing lots or garages
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CAPACITY: 79,451 LEASE DATE: 1119190
$43,000,000 in 1972; $6,500,000 in 1990 for new scoreboard, etc.
Largely inapplicable; the 1990 improvements were paid for by Public
and were contractually limited to a maximum of $6,500,000
$450,000 base rent; plus (in any lease year in which "gross receipts
net of taxes" exceed $7,500,000) 5% of gross receipts net of taxes
between $7,500,000 and $12,500,000; 4% from $12,500,000 to






N/A; Arrowhead is one facility within Harry S. Truman Sports
Complex
Team gets 100%
Team controls most non-NFL events and keeps all net revenues
therefrom; at small number of "civic and charitable" events Team
keeps all parking and concession revenues and may require user to
cover all other event-specific costs
Public's responsibility including insurance, utilities, and cleaning
Public's responsibility in accordance with "master plan" developed at
time of new lease; Team may also do other major improvements at
its own expense (with Public's consent)
Team gets 100% of net parking revenues at Arrowhead events from
approx. 17,800 spaces
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CAPACITY: 71,228 LEASE DATE: 7/1/90
$214,000,000
Public's responsibility
10% of "net ticket proceeds" on all home games and "public
exhibitions," which amount shall be no less than $50,000 per home
game; note: much of this is offset by a one-time "inducement
payment" of $6,000,000 to the Team and a yearly inducement
payment to Team of $4,000,000;
20 years
Team gets 100% net of rent above
Public gets 100%, but see inducement payment in rent, above; Team
has exclusive right to sell "football novelties"
Public gets 100% (but see inducement payment in rent, above)
except Team gets 100% for advertising messages on Falcon tickets
Team gets 100%
N/A
Public gets premium portion; Team gets "ticket" or "admission"
portion
Public controls and retains all revenues therefrom, subject to Team's
rights under its NFL game schedule
Public's responsibility
Public's responsibility
Public gets 100% (but see inducement payment in rent, above)
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CAPACrrY: 73,248 LEASE DATE: 8t27/90
$187,000,000 actual stadium construction costs paid by Team; approx.
$65,000,000 paid by Public on land acquisition and site preparation
The private ownership group which raised the approx. $200,000,000
($140,000,000 cash plus $60,000,000 foregone NFL broadcasting
revenue over three years) for this expansion team agreed in this lease
to pay for all stadium construction costs
$1 dollar per year for rental of land; Team paid $187,000,000 to build
stadium which Team owns





Team gets 100%; 10-year deal with Ericsson for $20,000,000
Team gets 100%
Team controls, schedules, and retains revenues from all major non-
NFL events; City of Charlotte and County of Mecklenburg have
rights to certain number of civic events but lease is silent on any
revenue sharing arrangements
Shared: Team's responsibility includes cleaning and routine upkeep;
Public's responsibility includes security and utilities
Public's responsibility
Team gets 100% net parking revenues for NFL events and up to five
other events, but only for 2,200 spaces on adjacent "deck" where
parking is included in luxury box and club seat prices; otherwise
Team shares net revenues with City of Charlotte and private lot
owner
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MAJOR RENOVATION: 1994-95 CAPACrrY: 73,800
9/7193
$121,000,000 renovation completed in 1995
Amounts over $121,000,000 are paid by Team over 30-year period as
"supplemental rent" (the first $121,000,000 paid by Public)
Base rent $250,000 per year, first 5 years; $500,000 per year, years 6-
10; $1,000,000 per year, years 11 - 20; and $1,250,000 per year, years
21 - 30; Team may have to make a supplemental rent payment each
year amortizing City's excess renovation contributions over 30 years
if City pays more than $121,000,000
30 years
Team gets 100% of (maximum) $2.50 ticket surcharge, dedicated to
stadium uses
Team gets 100% of net revenues on game days
Team gets 100% of game day revenues with the exception of certain
rights of visiting teams with respect to scoreboard messages and
banners
Team gets 100% of game day revenues
Shared as follows: Each year City gets first $250,000 but must put this
into "maintenance fund;" Team gets next $250,000; City and Team
split all remaining amounts 50-50; in 1997 Alltel paid $6,200,000 for
10-year naming rights deal
Team gets 100%
Public retains all net revenues from gate, ticket surcharge, parking,
concessions, broadcasting, and some advertising at all non-NFL
events including other sporting events, concerts, etc., but City must
put the first $250,000 of all such revenues into the "maintenance
fund" each year
Shared; Team maintains furniture and equipment in Team-specific
areas; Public responsible for electricity, water, sewer, security, game-
day personnel such as ticket-takers, ushers, etc.
Public's responsibility; City makes yearly deposit of $500,000
($250,000 from naming rights and $250,000 from non-NFL event
revenues) into "maintenance fund" which is used for both the City's
maintenance responsibilities and major repairs and improvements
Shared; Team retains all NFL-game day parking revenues except
$2.00 per patron which goes to the City (this amount may be
adjusted annually per CPI up to 4%)
2000]
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CAPACITY: 72,968 LEASE DATE: 9/30/94
$134,000,000 in 1975; major renovations in 1997 cost $22,800,000
Largely inapplicable; the 1997 renovations were mainly new box
suites paid for by the Team; 1975 original construction financed by
bond issue backed by hotel tax
Base rent of $25,000 per home game or 5% of "gross ticket sales,"
whichever is greater, up to a maximum of $800,000 per year
25 years with two 5-year extension options
Team gets 100%
Shared; Team gets 42% of gross concessions
Team gets 100% of advertising receipts, but management firm hired
by Public retains control of all advertising decisions and marketing
Team gets 100%
N/A
Team gets 100% under most circumstances
Since this is a multi-use facility the situation is somewhat reversed,
with the management firm hired by the Public retaining control of
scheduling, and the Team receiving only three days each year in
which to hold its own non-game events such as "fan day," "new suite
sales party," etc., and the Team must reimburse the management firm
for expenses attributable to such use
Public's responsibility
Public's responsibility
Control and revenues retained by Public; Team gets 215 free spaces
on game days
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CAPACITY: 65,321 DATE OF LEASE: 1117/95
$280,000,000
All construction costs are the Public's responsibility
Base rent of $250,000 per year
30 years
Team gets 100% for home games and Team-sponsored events
Shared; for games and other Team-sponsored events, Team controls
and receives net concession revenues except those attributable to
"level 100" which go to the Public per its arrangement with its own
concessionaire; for Public sponsored events the Public gets various
percentages of net concession revenues attributable to areas outside
level 100 (but these are dedicated to capital improvements)
Shared generally as follows: Team gets 75% and Public gets 25% of
first $6,000,000 in "net advertising revenues" and after that Team gets
90% and Public gets 10%
Team gets 100% for all home games and other Team-sponsored
events
Agreement appears to give Public and Team joint power to
determine name, but gives Public all revenues derived therefrom; in
1995 TWA agreed to pay $1,300,000 per year for 20 years (increased
3.5% each year)
Team gets 100%
Public controls all scheduling subject to dictates of NFL schedule;
certain number of days each year reserved for Team-sponsored, non-
NFL events; at Public-sponsored events Public receives gate plus its
portion of concessions (see above)
Public's responsibility
Public's responsibility partially funded by Public's share of
concessions and Public's gate receipts for Public-sponsored events
Public entities control and receive revenues; Team gets 1,200 spaces
reserved for it and game patrons on game days; Public entities also
agree to pay Team $1.50 for each space used per game patron on
game days
2000]
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CAPACITY: 71,294 LEASE DATE: 5130195
$27,000,000 in 1968; $78,000,000 for major renovations completed
1997
Originally the Public was to pay for all 1997 renovations at a set cost
of $60,000,000, and had option to refuse additional expenditures;
additional $18,000,000 covered by naming rights deal (although this is
not stated in lease)
Base rent of 10% of gross income for all home games
25 years
Team gets 100% less $1.50 per ticket surcharge (dedicated to
renovations); also less rental obligation (above); Public guarantees
60,000 per game attendance for first 10 years of lease and pays Team
for any shortfall
Shared; Public hires concessionaire and receives a portion of gross
concession revenues which are dedicated to amortizing a portion of
the new renovations; Team receives "net concession revenues" from
concessionaire, along with right to merchandise "NFL products" at
selected locations
Shared; complicated arrangement involving the City (which gets
25%), the Padres baseball team, and future revenue splits with
respect to new scoreboard
Team gets 100%
Lease is silent; in 1997 Qualcomm, Corp. paid $18,000,000 cash for
20-year deal
Public gets 10%, Team gets 90% of gross revenues
Team's use strictly limited to game days and other NFL-related
activities; Public retains rights over all other events scheduling and
retains revenues therefrom
Public's responsibility
Looks like Public's responsibility; lease only expressly addresses the
1997 renovations which are partially paid for through $1.50 ticket
surcharge and $2.00 per parking patron charge (see below)
Team receives "net parking revenues" for each home game, as well as
500 free spaces for game days; in 1998 and 1999 $1.00 per parking
patron went into "stadium improvement fund" to help pay for 1997
renovations; this amount will increase to $2.00 beginning with the
2000 season
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CAPACrrY: 68,915 LEASE DATE: 10/27/95
$220,000,000
All construction costs are the Public's responsibility
Rent free
30 years
Team gets 100% less State of Maryland 10% admissions tax




Initial agreement called for mutual approval by Team and Public;
c.1998 PSINet deal could result in as much as $100,000,000 over 20
years to Team
Team gets 100% of club seats and luxury suites; Team used proceeds
of PSL sales to amortize up-front cash commitment
Team controls scheduling, but Public has right to designate certain
events as "included events" for which Team and Public split revenues
50-50 (includes concessions, parking, gate, and some advertising)
Team's responsibility through periodic reimbursements to Public
Public's responsibility through a "capital improvement fund" with
constant balance of $600,000
Public operates and maintains approx. 4,000 spaces; Team receives
net parking revenues from these spaces for home games and other
NFL-related events;
2000]
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CAPACITY: 65-70,000 LEAsE DATE: 2/13/96
$180,000,000 estimate
Team's responsibility; must be approved by Public; in certain cases
may be paid jointly by Team and Public
Base rent set at a minimum figure of $200,000 per year, this could go
much higher in certain years depending on the size and use of a
number of offsets
30 years, approx. with one 10-year extension option
Team gets 100% at all home games and other Team-sponsored events
Team gets 100% at all home games and other Team-sponsored events
Team gets 100% at all home games and other Team-sponsored events
Team gets 100% at all home games and other Team-sponsored events
Team gets 100%; currently in negotiations with Hyperion
Communications
Team gets 100%
Some sharing of revenues with the Sports Authority of Nashville and
Davidson County for "civic events" and with Tennessee State
University for college football games; involves at a minimum
advertising and broadcasting, and all subject to intricate off-setting
costs arrangements
Team' responsibility
Public's responsibility partially funded by certain civic event revenues
Team operates and receives net revenues; 1,500 spaces reserved for
the use of the Sports Authority but these must be made available to
the Team on game days
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CAPAcriry: 65,000 LEASE DATE: 8/28/96
$168,500,000
Public's responsibility, but only after Public and Team mutually agree
that such changes are "indispensable to the proper function of the
Stadium"
Base rent of $3,500,000 (from club seat revenues)
30 years approx.
Team gets 100% net of 8% ticket surcharge capped at $2.50 per
ticket
Team gets 100% at all home games and other Team-sponsored events
Team gets 100% at all home games and other Team-sponsored events
Team gets 100%; in 1998 Team announced a $39,000,000 over 13-year
deal with Raymond James Fimancial
Team gets 100% (but see above, Team uses club seat revenue to pay
annual rent)
Public has right to sponsor all other events (on non-game days, etc.)
but each year the Public must give the first $2,000,000 of such special
event revenue (net of costs, taxes, etc.) to Team and 50% of all such
revenue in excess of $2,000,000
Public's responsibility
Public's responsibility
Authority operates, Team receives all net revenues from home games
and other Team sponsored events
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To begin by February 2003 CAPACITY: 65,000
7/1/98
$225,000,000 estimate
Apparently the responsibility of the Team and/or "corporate donors;"
all change orders must be mutually approved by Team and Public
entities
$250,000 base rent; offset by any future ticket surcharges or
admission tax
35 years with six ten-year extension options
Team gets 100% at all home games and other Team-sponsored events
Team gets 100% at all home games and other Team-sponsored events
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100% on its own stadium and also the right to jointly
exploit (with the Tigers) the name of the complex as a whole
Team gets 100%
Public granted right to use stadium for limited number of "civic,
charitable or cultural events" and to retain net revenues from
admissions and a case-by-case bargained-for amount on concessions
Team's responsibility including utilities; may be partially offset by
reimbursements from "operations and maintenance fund" to be
created by Public with ad valorem tax revenues paid by Team and
concessionaires on stadium operations
Shared; after the sixth lease year, Team contributes $300,000 per year
into "major repair and replacement fund" (Public responsible for any
excess amounts necessary); an "escrow agent" mutually selected by
Team and Public controls all disbursements from this fund
Team gets 100%
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Under construction CAPACITy: approx. 72,000
$280,000,000 estimate
The Team and the City of Cleveland split the first $20,000,000 in cost
overruns 50-50; after that the City covers 100%
$250,000 Base rent per year
30 years
Team gets 100% less 8% admissions tax (of which 2% is dedicated to
stadium construction costs)




Team gets 100%; proceeds from PSLs in excess of $35,000,000 paid to
City of Cleveland to offset Public's stadium construction costs
Team gets 100% at all non-NFL events whether Team-sponsored or
sponsored by third parties, with exception of up to eight "city events"
("civic, cultural, or community events"); City gets all revenues from
these less reasonable maintenance and operating costs allocable
thereto
Team's responsibility
Shared; "capital repair fund" established with Public money; if Team
desires certain capital improvements which exceed amounts currently
in this fund, Team must make up shortfall
Under Public control; Team gets 450 free spaces for use on game
days and Public agrees to make approx. 2,800 nearby spaces available
for lease by Team
2000]
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Under construction CAPACrrY: 66,965
5/29/97
$270,000,000 estimate
Shared; Public probably covers first $5,000,000 (although this is called
the "Team Contingency Amount"); Team covers any excess amounts
over $5,000,000
Team to pay $11,700,000 over the first nine years; no annual rent
thereafter
approx. 25 years
Team gets 100% net of $0.25 per ticket surcharge; Public guarantees
50,000 yearly attendance or pays (credits rent) the difference to Team
Team gets 100% on "team use days"
Team gets 100% on "team use days"
Team gets 100% on "team use days"
Team gets 100% of any future deal; for time being it's N/A
Team gets 100% generally; up to and including the 2000 season,
County sells "COAs" (charter ownership agreements; similar to
PSLs) and retains revenues therefrom to be applied towards
construction costs
At "other events" (concerts, other sporting events, mass meetings,
etc.) regardless of sponsor, Team and Public split all "net revenues"
50-50 (including gate, concessions, advertising, broadcasting); on
"county use days" County receives all "net revenues"
Public's responsibility
Public's responsibility
Team gets 100% of net revenues at Team-sponsored events



















Team's responsibility; if, however, the Team successfully markets at
least $17,000,000 in club seats (part of the Team's contribution to
stadium construction costs), Team gets a credit against rent for any
cost overruns it covers
Largely inapplicable; the 1990 improvements were paid for by
Public and were contractually limited to a maximum of $6,500,000
Public's responsibility
The private ownership group which raised the approx. $200,000,000
($140,000,000 cash plus $60,000,000 foregone NFL broadcasting
revenue over three years) for this expansion team agreed in this
lease to pay for all stadium construction costs
Amounts over $121,000,000 are paid by Team over 30-year period
as "supplemental rent" (the first $121,000,000 paid by Public)
Largely inapplicable; the 1997 renovations were mainly new box
suites paid for by the Team; 1975 original construction financed by
bond issue backed by hotel tax
All construction costs are the Public's responsibility
Originally the Public was to pay for all 1997 renovations at a set
cost of $60,000,000, and had option to refuse additional
expenditures; additional $18,000,000 covered by naming rights deal
(although this is not stated in lease)
All construction costs are the Public's responsibility
Team's responsibility; must be approved by Public; in certain cases
may be paid jointly by Team and Public
Public's responsibility, but only after Public and Team mutually
agree that such changes are "indispensable to the proper function
of the Stadium"
Apparently the responsibility of the Team and/or "corporate
donors;" all change orders must be mutually approved by Team and
Public entities
The Team and the City of Cleveland split the first $20,000,000 in
cost overruns 50-50; after that the City covers 100%
Shared; Public probably covers first $5,000,000 (although this is
called the "Team Contingency Amount"); Team covers any excess
amounts over $5,000,000
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Base rent of $250,000 per year
$450,000 base rent; plus (in any lease year in which "gross receipts
net of taxes" exceed $7,500,000) 5% of gross receipts net of taxes
between $7,500,000 and $12,500,000; 4% from $12,500,000 to
$17,500,000; and 2% over $17,500,000
10% of "net ticket proceeds" on all home games and "public
exhibitions," which amount shall be no less than $50,000 per home
game; note: much of this is offset by a one-time "inducement
payment" of $6,000,000 to the Team and a yearly inducement
payment to Team of $4,000,000
$1 dollar per year for rental of land; Team paid $187,000,000 to
build stadium which Team owns
Base rent of $250,000 per year for first five years, $500,000 per year
for sixth through tenth year, $1,000,000 per year for eleventh
through twentieth year, and $1,250,000 per year for twenty-first
through thirtieth year; Team may have to make a supplemental rent
payment each year (if City pays more than $121,000,000 in
renovation costs) which will amortize City's excess contributions
over 30 years
Base rent of $25,000 per home game or 5% of "gross ticket sales,"
whichever is greater, up to a maximum of $800,000 per year
Base rent of $250,000 per year
Base rent of 10% of gross income for all home games
Rent free
Base rent set at a minimum figure of $200,000 per year; this could
go much higher in certain years depending on the size and use of a
number of offsets
Base rent of $3,500,000 (from club seat revenues)
$250,000 base rent; offset by any future ticket surcharges or
admission taxes
$250,000 Base rent per year
Team to pay $11,700,000 over the first nine years; no annual rent
thereafter
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Team has option to sell and retain 100% of all revenues
N/A; Arrowhead is one facility within Harry S. Truman Sports
Complex
N/A
Team gets 100%; 10-year deal with Ericsson for $20,000,000
Shared as follows: Each year City gets first $250,000 but must put
this into "maintenance fund;" Team gets next $250,000; City and
Team split all remaining amounts 50-50; in 1997 Alltel paid
$6,200,000 for 10-year naming rights deal
N/A
Agreement appears to give Public and Team joint power to
determine name, but gives Public all revenues derived therefrom; in
1995 TWA agreed to pay $1,300,000 per year for 20 years
(increased 3.5% each year)
Lease is silent; in 1997 Qualcomm, Corp. paid $18,000,000 cash for
20-year deal
Initial agreement called for mutual approval by Team and Public;
c.1998 PSINet deal could result in as much as $100,000,000 over 20
years to Team
Team gets 100%; currently in negotiations with Hyperion
Communications
Team gets 100%; in 1998 Team announced a $39,000,000 over 13-
year deal with Raymond James Financial
Team gets 100% on its own stadium and also the right to jointly
exploit (with the Tigers) the name of the complex as a whole
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100% of any future deal; for time being it's N/A
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At Team-sponsored non-sporting events (concerts, mass meetings,
etc.) Team gets 85% and Public gets 15% of "event specific net
revenues;" this probably includes, at minimum, gate, concessions,
and parking; unclear if it covers advertising or broadcasting; almost
certainly does not cover premium portions of enhanced seating; in
addition, five dates per year reserved for "public events;" any
revenue sharing arrangements with respect to these are not yet
finalized
Team controls most non-NFL events and keeps all net revenues
therefrom; at small number of "civic and charitable" events Team
keeps all parking and concession revenues and may require user to
cover all other event-specific costs
Public controls and retains all revenues therefrom, subject to Teams
rights under its NFL game schedule
Team controls, schedules, and retains revenues from all major non-
NFL events; City of Charlotte and County of Mecklenburg have
rights to certain number of civic events but lease is silent on any
revenue sharing arrangements
Public retains all net revenues from gate, ticket surcharge, parking,
concessions, broadcasting, and some advertising at all non-NFL
events including other sporting events, concerts, etc., but City must
put the first $250,000 of all such revenues into the "maintenance
fund" each year
Since this is a multi-use facility the situation is somewhat reversed,
with the management firm hired by the Public retaining control of
scheduling, and the Team receiving only three days each year in
which to hold its own non-game events such as "fan day," "new
suite sales party," etc., and the Team must reimburse the
management firm for expenses attributable to such use
Public controls all scheduling subject to dictates of NFL schedule;
certain number of days each year reserved for Team-sponsored,
non-NFL events; at Public-sponsored events Public receives gate
plus its portion of concessions
Team's use strictly limited to game days and other NFL-related
activities; Public retains rights over all other events scheduling and
retains revenues therefrom
Team controls scheduling, but Public has right to designate certain
events as "included events" for which Team and Public split
revenues 50-50 (includes concessions, parking, gate, and some
advertising)
Some sharing of revenues with the Sports Authority of Nashville
and Davidson County for "civic events" and with Tennessee State
University for college football games; involves at a minimum
advertising and broadcasting, and all subject to intricate off-setting
costs arrangements
Public has right to sponsor all other events (on non-game days, etc.)
but each year the Public must give the first $2,000,000 of such
special event revenue (net of costs, taxes, etc.) to Team and 50% of
all such revenue in excess of $2,000,000
Public granted right to use stadium for limited number of "civic,
charitable or cultural events" and to retain net revenues from
admissions and a case-by-case bargained-for amount on concessions
TEAM
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CLEvELAND BROVINS:
CINCINNATI BENGALS:
Team gets 100% at all non-NFL events whether Team-sponsored or
sponsored by third parties, with exception of up to eight "city
events" ("civic, cultural, or community events"); City gets all
revenues from these less reasonable maintenance and operating
costs allocable thereto
At "other events" (concerts, other sporting events, mass meetings,
etc.) regardless of sponsor, Team and Public split all "net revenues"
50-50 (including gate, concessions, advertising, broadcasting); on
"county use days" County receives all "net revenues"
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Shared; Public contributes $3,000,000 from initial Plan B bond issue;
Team contributes all ticket surcharge proceeds in excess of
$1,400,000; (Team may also contribute visiting teams' share of club
seat revenues, but only after the 16th year) any capital
improvements exceeding amounts in capital reserve fund will be the
responsibility of the Public
Public's responsibility in accordance with "master plan" developed
at time of new lease; Team may also do other major improvements
at its own expense (with Public's consent)
Public's responsibility
Public's responsibility
Public's responsibility; City makes yearly deposit of $500,000
($250,000 from naming rights and $250,000 from non-NFL event
revenues) into "maintenance fund" which is used for both the City's
maintenance responsibilities and major repairs and improvements
Public's responsibility
Public's responsibility partially funded by Public's share of
concessions and Public's gate receipts for Public-sponsored events
Looks like Public's responsibility; lease only expressly addresses the
1997 renovations which are partially paid for through $1.50 ticket
surcharge and $2.00 per parking patron charge
Public's responsibility through a "capital improvement fund" with
constant balance of $600,000
Public's responsibility partially funded by certain civic event
revenues
Public's responsibility
Shared; after the sixth lease year, Team contributes $300,000 per
year into "major repair and replacement fund" (Public responsible
for any excess amounts necessary); an "escrow agent" mutually
selected by Team and Public controls all disbursements from this
fund
Shared; "capital repair fund" established with Public money; if
Team desires certain capital improvements which exceed amounts
currently in this fund, Team must make up shortfall
Public's responsibility
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Still in negotiations; the intent is to give the Team "game-day net
revenues" from approx. 5,000 nearby parking spaces in new or
existing lots or garages
Team gets 100% of net parking revenues at Arrowhead events from
approx. 17,800 spaces
Public gets 100% (but largely offset by "inducement payment" to
Team)
Team gets 100% net parking revenues for NFL events and up to
five other events, but only for 2,200 spaces on adjacent "deck"
where parking is included in luxury box and club seat prices;
otherwise Team shares net revenues with City of Charlotte and
private lot owner
Shared; Team retains all NFL-game day parking revenues except
$2.00 per patron which goes to the City (this amount may be
adjusted annually per CPI up to 4%)
Control and revenues retained by Public; Team gets 215 free spaces
on game days
Public entities control and receive revenues; Team gets 1,200 spaces
reserved for it and game patrons on game days; Public entities also
agree to pay Team $1.50 for each space used per game patron on
game days
Team receives "net parking revenues" for each home game, as well
as 500 free spaces for game days; in 1998 and 1999 $1.00 per
parking patron went into "stadium improvement fund" to help pay
for 1997 renovations; this amount will increase to $2.00 beginning
with the 2000 season
Public operates and maintains approx. 4,000 spaces; Team receives
net parking revenues from these spaces for games and NFL-related
events
Team operates and receives net revenues; 1,500 spaces reserved for
the use of the Sports Authority but these must be made available to
the Team on game days
Authority operates, Team receives all net revenues from home
games and other Team sponsored events
Team gets 100%
Under Public control; Team gets 450 free spaces for use on game
days and Public agrees to make approx. 2,800 nearby spaces
available for lease by Team
Team gets 100% of net revenues at Team-sponsored events
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